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INTRODUCTION
Those who work in and study American dispute resolution may be
left wondering in recent years whether familiar ground has been shifting
beneath their feet. The levels of discontent and controversy about dis-
puting and dispute processing seem quite high; even lawyers in a recent
ABA Journal poll responded by a substantial margin that there is "too
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much litigation."' If lawyers feel that way, the perception that our dis-
pute processing systems have significant problems must be widespread
indeed.2
The questioning, however, goes beyond familiar complaints about
the volume, cost, and delay of litigation. President Derek Bok of
Harvard University, himself a lawyer, criticizes American society for di-
verting too much of its talent into the legal profession, which he views as
a relatively unproductive use of well-trained minds. 3 The pace of change
in, and amount of controversy over, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
have increased 4 Judges often abandon their traditional role as relatively
passive umpires, taking initiatives to deal with perceived new needs and
complexities in litigation.5 Alternative dispute resolution (ADR), in
both free-standing and court-annexed varieties, has become one of the
American legal world's leading growth industries.
6
A vigorous movement calls into question whether we really have a
serious "litigation explosion"-and even if we do, whether it is such a
bad thing.7 Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner, although himself a
critic of writings skeptical of the "litigation explosion" argument,8 speaks
of a "decline of lawyers' self-confidence." He attributes the perceived
decline in large part to "a series of confidence-shattering events since the
early 1960s. All sorts of reforms adopted in this period, reforms engi-
neered by lawyers, appear to have miscarried."9
1. Reidinger, The Litigation Boom, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1, 1987, at 37 (responses to question, "Is
there too much litigation?", in poll of 578 lawyers reported as 62% yes, 33% no, 5% no opinion).
2. See, eg., Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE
L.J. 1643, 1644 (1985) ("Whether we have too many cases or too few, or even, miraculously, pre-
cisely the right number, there can be little doubt that the system is not working very well. Too many
cases take too much time to be resolved and impose too much cost upon litigants and taxpayers
alike.").
3. Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDUc. 570, 573 (1983).
4. See, eg., Burbank, Proposals to Amend Rule 68-Time to Abandon Ship, 19 U. MICH. J.L,
REF. 425 (1986); Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11--Some "Chilling" Problems in
the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEo. L.J. 1313 (1986).
5. See generally, eg., Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) (discussing
characteristics, goals, achievements, and problems of movement toward more active judicial man-
agement of pretrial phases of litigation); Symposium on Litigation Management, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
305 (1986) (examining the movement towards "managerial judging" and the measures imposed on
litigants by such judges).
6. See, eg., Alternative Dispute Resolution Symposium, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1985); Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution and the Courts, 69 JUDICATURE 252 (1986).
7. See generally, eg., J. LIEBERMAN, THE LInIous SOCIETY (1981); Galanter, Reading the
Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly
Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983).
8. See infra text accompanying note 58.
9. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV.
761; 769 (1987).
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This paper attempts to describe the setting for the current contro-
versies,10 to survey the state of theoretical and empirical understanding
of dispute processing, and to explore promising approaches to dealing
with our present problems. Its emphasis is on the procedural or adjective
side, broadly defined, rather than on substantive law. However
subordinate the role of procedure should be as the servant of justice, in
America its role is relatively prominent perhaps because of our society's
heterogeneity and comparative shortage of shared substantive values."
Given the complexity of the "problem," the paper tries to avoid being too
ambitious; it neither undertakes major fresh research into the quantita-
tive dimensions of the problem nor attempts to recommend highly spe-
cific solutions. Rather, it seeks to advance understanding and facilitate
reform-and a realistic appreciation of the difficulties of reform-by tak-
ing stock of the present state of knowledge, considering the social setting
and its implications for change, analyzing major paths to a "better way,"
and suggesting further work that could illuminate the choices to be
made.
I. ORIGINS AND CONCERNS OF THE STUDY
Speaking to the Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute in
May, 1985, Chief Justice Warren Burger called for an ALI study of liti-
gation and its alternatives. His address included these remarks:
For some disputes, trials will always be the only means, but for many
claims, we simply do not need trials by the adversary contest. As we
now practice it, that system is too costly, too painful, too destructive,
and too inefficient.
My submission is this: Has the time not come for a careful,
thoughtful, objective examination-a typical American Law Institute
study-of the whole litigation process under the common law
system[?]
10. On the importance of considering not just immediate problems but their sources and con-
texts, see M. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONs FAIL xiii (1983) ("Fo-
cusing on the shortcomings of a single practice without placing it in historical and functional context
usually leads to gross distortion and exaggeration. Efforts to eliminate such problems without alter-
ing incentives may result in their reappearance in another and perhaps more serious form."). See
also Rhode, The Rhetoric of Professional Reform, 45 MD. L. Rav. 274, 286-87 (1986) ("Informed
decisions about the appropriate structure[s] of dispute resolution must depend on greater attention
to the social, political, and legal culture in which they function. Analysis should center not only on
the comparative efficiencies of available processes, but also on the collective values to be served.").
11. See generally Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. Rav. 837, 841-42 (1984) (mentioning legitimat-
ing functions of procedure in heterogeneous American society with its few common cultural values);
Tyler, What Is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Proce-
dures, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 103, 132 (1988) (finding that "different types of people within Ameri-
can culture define the meaning of procedural justice in a similar way," which "suggests that
definitions of the meaning of justice within particular settings may be part of the cultural beliefs
shared by members of our society.").
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We need that study to answer the question: Is there a better way?
One question could well be whether the traditional lawsuit is the
fairest and most efficient means of dealing with personal and property
damage cases....
Another area of inquiry should probe the complex trials-anti-
trust cases, complex financial transactions, and securities fraud
claims....
Is our traditional "cross section" jury of lay persons capable of
grasping these sophisticated problems, especially when accountants,
business executives, lawyers and teachers are so freely excused from
jury duty?...
Yet another area deserving close study is the growing number of
multiple disaster claims that have emerged in recent decades. Is the
traditional jury trial the best way? I don't know. No one really
knows, but it deserves inquiry. That is how the resolution of claims
arising out of injuries in the course of employment came to be removed
from the jury box to compensation tribunals. 12
The Chief Justice's remarks indicate the possible breadth of the
study. As he also acknowledged, the Institute is already considering
some of the areas mentioned in his address. In particular, the Project on
Compensation and Liability for Product and Process Injuries and the
Study of Complex Litigation are major efforts to deal with related fields.
The present study will not attempt to duplicate the work of these other
projects. The study also will not deal in depth with issues of professional
responsibility or family law matters, the subjects of other ongoing or con-
templated ALI projects.13 The remaining terrain is largely that of ordi-
nary litigation, most commonly for damages, which provides the main
setting for this study.
14
To give more definite shape to the study, ALI Director Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., outlined its contemplated objectives in a proposal
memorandum:
(a) To describe the components of the overall problem perceived
by the Chief Justice and others, and the interrelationship of these
problems. So far as possible on the basis of existing empirical studies,
12. Burger, Opening Remarks, in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REMARKS AND ADDRESSES AT
THE 62D ANNUAL MEETING 1, 8-10 (1985).
13. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1988; No. 2,
1989); Hazard, Report of the Director, in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 1988 ANNUAL REPORT 27,
33-34.
14. See generally Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer, & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litiga-
tion, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 84 (1983) ("[The cases in courts of general jurisdiction are modest. The
parties are usually fighting over money, and the amounts at stake are $10,000 or less.") [hereinafter
Costs of Ordinary Litigation].
[Vol. 1989:824
PATHS TO A "BETTER WA Y"
the description will seek to indicate the relative quantitative dimen-
sions of the various components of the overall problem.
(b) To prepare an inventory and analysis of extant work that ad-
dresses one or more components of the problem. The inventory should
be a substantial bibliographic undertaking.15 The analysis would en-
deavor to put the material into a coherent framework keyed into the
description stated above.
(c) To explore the relation between the components of the present
problem and the basic premises upon which the present system oper-
ates.... In that light, the aim is to suggest further work that might be
fruitful concerning components of the problem, including research, pi-
lot projects, short-term experiments, and projects for the development
of state or federal legislation, new rules of judicial procedure, etc. To
the extent practical, the [study] would identify organizations that
might best undertake such work.
Discussing the possible product of the study, Professor Hazard's
memo stated:
The scope of the "litigation problem" obviously is very broad. It in-
cludes the antecedent dynamics of social conflict that can result in liti-
gation as well as dispute resolution issues such as procedures in civil
litigation. Approximate quantifying of the areas that contribute most
to the "litigation problem" might help in identifying priorities.
[A final product] would not recommend specific substantive
changes in law and procedure, but could help to state the proper ques-
tions and to identify paths on which society might proceed. Paths for
inquiry might be the alteration of present economic incentives for pros-
ecution and defense of claims, reallocations of the costs of litigation,
and redefining the opportunities for review of administrative agency
proceedings.
II. ELEMENTS AND SOURCES OF THE "PROBLEM"
The fields under consideration here are numerous and broad enough
that exploration could begin at more than one point. Starting with a
discussion of perceived maladies, rather than with the values and pur-
poses to be served, could seem to put the cart before the horse-and to
presume that things are seriously wrong in important respects, a view not
universally shared. Still, it makes sense to begin with complaints about
the civil justice system (and responses to them); the perception of
problems was, after all, the origin of Chief Justice Burger's call for the
study. Moreover, discussion in later sections of values and goals can
form part of a bridge to consideration of paths to "better ways," along
15. The July, 1988 draft of this background paper, printed in limited quantity by the American
Law Institute, contained an annotated bibliography, which is omitted here to conserve space.
Sources from that bibliography are cited when relevant in the footnotes to this article. For an exten-
sive recent compilation, see NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, DISPUTE RESOLU-
TION AND THE COURTS: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (1989).
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with an understanding of the social constraints on change; the values and
social constraints frame what we can and should be trying to accomplish.
In any event, order of treatment here is not intended to prejudge issues
concerning the existence, seriousness, and evaluation of problems in civil
dispute processing systems, nor to imply that doing justice should take
second place to clearing dockets.
A. Symptoms.
The litany of complaints about the civil justice system is largely a
familiar one. 16 Perhaps most frequently mentioned among the perceived
problems are cost, high volume, and delay. Common dissatisfactions
also include excessive complexity and formality; stress and aggravation
of tensions between parties; lack of access to justice for many, especially
the poor and those with relatively little experience in the legal system;
and high incidence of frivolous claims. 17
To develop some of these themes in more detail, the problems of
cost can include sheer cost to litigants and its effect of favoring the well-
financed, 18 the expenses of the judicial system, and what portion of total
damage recoveries actually ends up compensating clients as opposed to
paying their lawyers. 19 The volume of litigation in America is often sup-
posed to be high both in relation to historical experience and to rates in
comparable nations; 20 the caseload is frequently attributed to high and
16. For listings of elements similar to that in the text here, see J. MARKS, E. JOHNSON, & P.
SZANTON, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AMERICA: PROCESSES IN EVOLUTION 16-19 (1984); E. JOHN-
SON, A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR PROCESSING CIVIL DISPUTES
1-4 (1977).
17. The picture sketched here is not necessarily that drawn by any one critic, since it contains
possibly inconsistent elements--such as heavy deterrence to claims from the cost of pursuing them,
along with large numbers of undeterred plaintiffs pressing undeserving claims. Moreover, as later
discussion will bring out, several influential commentators question the accuracy of many of these
perceptions, at least as a matter of degree, and also call into doubt whether high litigation rates-if
they exist--should be viewed as that serious a problem.
18. See Marcotte, Unequal JuStice, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1989, at 44 (reporting on poll ofjudges and
lawyers).
19. Studies from the Federal Judicial Center and the Rand Institute for Civil Justice address
these several aspects of litigation costs. See, eg., J. KAKALIK & N. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSA-
TION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION (1988) (indicating that about half of total of gross payments for
tort compensation plus legal fees and expenses goes to injured parties); Levin & Colliers, Containing
the Cost of Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 219, 222 (1985) (rising portion of GNP devoted to legal
expenses); id at 227 (reckoning cost of tort trials to federal judicial system at approximately $600
per hour in 1982).
20. One nation sometimes cited as an enviable contrast, with high emphasis on conciliation and
low rates of litigation, is Japan. But see Galanter, supra note 7, at 59 (footnote omitted):
The real check on Japanese litigation is the deliberate limitation of institutional capac-
ity; the number of courts and lawyers is kept small....
Of course many jobs done by lawyers in the United States are done by non-lawyers in
Japan-and practically everywhere else. The small number of lawyers in Japan, however,
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rising litigiousness21 and is believed to result, among other things, in
backlogged courts, overworked judges, and assembly-line justice.22 Ex-
cessive delay itself denies justice. Moreover, especially if claimants do
not receive prejudgment interest at market rates, delay systematically fa-
vors defendants and often tends to disfavor have-nots.2
3
The judicial process, although widely admired for its procedural
guarantees and thoroughness, can become too costly, cumbersome and
formal in many of its aspects and for many types of cases. The system's
elaborateness creates openings for abusive, dilatory tactics that force set-
tlements too removed from the merits (if not outright abandonment of
valid claims or defenses), and confers unfair advantages on better-heeled
or especially tenacious litigants. At the same time, many often complain
that outlandish and frivolous claims are too frequent. A closely related,
but perhaps not adequately emphasized, problem is the continuation of
initially plausible claims and defenses once their lack of merit has be-
come apparent. As later discussion will bring out, many elements of this
bleak picture are challenged; but it seems important to set out as back-
ground the principal aspects of the perceived problems with dispute
processing systems, even if it can be said of American courts that "half of
the lies they tell about them aren't true."
reflects not an aversion to law, but a severe constriction of opportunities to enter the pro-
fession.... In sum, the low rate of litigation in Japan evidences not the preferences of the
population, but deliberate policy choices by political elites.
See also Miller, Apples vs. Persimmons: The Legal Profession in Japan and the United States, 39 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 27 (1989) (discussing differences between legal systems of Japan and America, includ-
ing performance of out-of-court legal functions by those not licensed to try lawsuits; relative absence
of legally enforceable civil rights and civil liberties provisions; and access barriers such as high up-
front fees, shortages of judges, and large backlogs).
21. But see Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3, 8 (1986) ("If
there were a generalized litigation fever, loosening the restraints that inhibit the making of claims,
we would expect to find that the increase was general-that the rate for all types of cases moved in
the same direction. But... some kinds of cases are increasing while others are decreasing. The
world of litigation is composed of sub-populations of cases that seem to respond to specific condi-
tions rather than to global changes in climate.").
22. See, eg., Edwards, The Role of Legal Education in Shaping the Profession, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 285, 286 (1988).
23. Concerning the relative severity of delay problems, see COUNCIL ON THE ROLE OF
COURTS, THE ROLE OF COURTS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (1984) [hereinafter CORC REPORT]. The
report states that a Justice Department study of patterns of court delay in five counties "suggests
that while the delay rate may be higher today than at the turn of the century, for many types of
adjudicated cases it is lower than it was in 1963-64." Id. at 61.
For perspective on the question of delay, some amount of it may be the price for pursuing other
valued ends. Professor Stephan Landsman of Cleveland-Marshall Law School argues that the adver-
sary system-which he defends on several grounds, including the protection of individual rights-
necessarily entails at least a considerable degree of deliberateness. Landsman, The Decline of the
Adversary System: How the Rhetoric of Swift and Certain Justice Has Affected Adjudication in Amer-
ican Courts, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 487, 499-501 (1980).
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B. Causes, Data, and Their Evaluation.
Any effort to account for the present condition of our dispute
processing systems must reckon with a broad range of sources and
causes. These include at least the following: the underlying existence of
disagreements and potential disputes, and the influence of changing so-
cial and economic patterns on types of injuries and on the propensity of
potential litigants to pursue grievances; long-standing attitudes toward
using courts to resolve social and political issues, and changing ideas
about legal entitlements and the legitimacy of pursuing them in court
("rights consciousness"); resulting changes in the size and makeup of
court caseloads; and the efficacy of alternative dispute processing and
problems with how the adjudication system itself handles disputes. A
survey of these varying factors can help suggest the relative seriousness
of our present dispute processing problems, how much they can be im-
proved, if at all, and the relative desirability of general or targeted
responses.
1. Social and Political Setting. No study of this sort would be
complete without mentioning de Tocqueville's durable observation,
"Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not
resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question."'24 Two foreign observ-
ers recently have suggested reasons why de Tocqueville's insight remains
accurate. First, at least as a matter of degree, the United States is almost
certainly unique in the extent to which its constitutional guarantees are
both quite general and readily enforceable in court.25 Second, the disper-
sion of American political authority, with the resulting difficulty of
mobilizing for widespread change through ordinary political processes,
makes litigation an especially attractive avenue for many of those seeking
reform.26 Often, courts are simply the most efficient routes for getting
24. 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Knopfed. 1945). See also, e.g., M.
DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 44 (1986), who states:
Many have observed that Americans tend to convert all sorts of problems into legal issues:
even matters that are elsewhere perceived as not "legal" at all end up in American courts.
In this Tocquevillian sense, American legal culture is undeniably "legalistic." . . . [T]he
Constitution, a document studded with broad standards of ethical and political signifi-
cance ... makes sharp separation of the ethical, political, and legal-technical domains both
unnatural and impracticable.
25. See, eg., FitzGerald, Grievances, Disputes & Outcomes: A Comparison ofAustrala and the
United States, 1 LAW IN CONTEXT 15, 43 (1983) ("There is no effective counterpart [in Australia] to
American Constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.").
26. See M. DAMASKA, supra note 24, at 238-39; see also Atiyah, Tort Law and the Alternatives:
Some Anglo-American Comparisons, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1002, 1018 (commenting on relative emphasis
on decisionmaking by centralized political institutions in Britain, in contrast with greater role of
markets and decentralized jury and judicial decisions in America).
(Vol. 1989:824
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attention paid to, and effecting action on, claims of broad social and
political import as well as those of individual wrong.
Superimposed on long-established attitudes are the effects of social
and economic developments. To begin with, economic growth itself may
make social interrelations more complex and numerous so that they tend
to breed more disputes. 27 The increases in both crowding and anonymity
that go with urbanization also may raise the underlying level of disputes
and willingness to press grievances. 28 Mass technology multiplies the ef-
fects of Murphy's Law; large increases in litigation resulting from tech-
nology probably began no later than with the automobile29 and have
continued down to the present with such mass suits as those over the
Dalkon Shield intrauterine device.30 The broad spread of insurance cov-
erage raises the chances that suing a prospective defendant will be worth
the effort and provides, through the liability insurer's obligation to de-
fend, a form of legal expense insurance.
Furthermore, even after over a decade of deregulation, there is sim-
ply more law. As Professor Albert Alschuler of the University of Chi-
cago Law School has put it, "one suspects that some of those who have
decried the litigation explosion have simply misspoken. Their ill-articu-
lated complaint has not been about the volume of litigation but rather the
expanding reach of our substantive law."131 Many modem social devel-
opments have contributed both to the increase in regulation and to wid-
ened expectations that rights can and should be enforced. Professor
27. See Marvell, Civil Caseloads: The Impact of the Economy and Trial Judgeship Increases, 69
JUDICATURE 153, 155 (1985) (suggesting that time-lagged correlation between economic growth and
court caseloads "supports the conclusion that economic activity leads to more interactions and,
hence, more chances for disputes and, later, litigation"); id. at 156 ("[e]conomic conditions greatly
affect civil filings, especially regular civil cases. The likely cause of the impact is that more societal
activity leads to more chances for disputes. The impact, however, is not immediate, and that is
probably why it is not common knowledge.").
28. See, e.g., Sanders, The Meaning of the Law Explosion: On Friedman's Total Justice, 1987
AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 601, 605 (reviewing L. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE (1985)) ("Litigation is
... fostered by changes in relationships. The social and emotional distance between victims and
their physicians, teachers, merchants, and landlords removes inhibitions against bringing a formal
lawsuit .... In a closely knit society, a formal lawsuit is likely to destroy primary social relation-
ships. As society moves from primary to secondary relationships there is a good deal less at stake.")
(footnote omitted). But see Galanter, supra note 7, at 38-41 (discussing studies of pre-20th century
American urban and rural areas indicating much higher litigiousness than today).
29. See, eg., CORC REPORT, supra note 23, at 50 (attributing rise in tort cases from 1% of
dockets in 1903-04 to 14% in 1963-64 primarily to rise of "automobile culture").
30. See, ag., In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 376 (1989).
31. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and the Need
for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808, 1818 (1986) (footnote omitted),
see also CORC REPORT, supra note 23, at 47 ("it is evident that legislation has generated huge
numbers of cases"); Enslen, ADR: Another Acronym, or a Viable Alternative to the High Cost of
Litigation and Crowded Court Dockets? The Debate Commences, 18 N.M.L. REv. 1, 6-10 (1988)
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Lawrence Friedman of Stanford Law School refers to "the general expec-
tation of justice" as "a genuine feature of American legal culture. '32
Friedman continues: "If somebody senses a wrong, she feels that there
must be a remedy, somewhere in the system. These examples, then, are
chips off a larger, more significant, block: the welfare state itself, and the
principle of social insurance, products themselves of changes in social
expectation. '
'33
Yet despite the expectations of justice and redress, the welfare state
in America today probably provides less comprehensive coverage against
individual injury and misfortune than in most other industrialized de-
mocracies. Victims who want redress, but in other nations might be sat-
isfied with benefits from social insurance schemes, often have no
alternative in the United States but to press individual claims. Thus the
failure of the left in the United States to enact broader redistributive
measures may correlate with individual litigiousness, if indeed it is
greater in the United States than elsewhere. 34
(listing federal legislation, along with court decisions, more lawyers, scientific progress, and organi-
zational centralization, among causes of increased litigation).
32. L. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE 76 (1985). See generally Sanders, supra note 28, at 604-05
(pointing out how both technological and social changes, such as vaccines and widespread insurance,
have led to increased control over risks; arguing that this control has changed popular expectations,
contributing to more regulatory efforts to control risk and suits to seek expected compensation for
injuries that are not the fault of victims).
33. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 76. Whether our system is willing to and should satisfy
such expectations, or whether the response will more likely-and appropriately?-be one of viewing
resulting caseloads as excessive, is a subject of debate. For one view, see Merry, Disputing Without
Culture (Book Review), 100 HARV. L. REv. 2057, 2072 (1987) (review of S. GOLDBERO, E. GREEN,
& F. SANDER, DIsPUTE RESOLUTION (1985)) (footnote omitted):
Proponents of the notion that the courts are too congested, and therefore that new alterna-
tives are necessary, may be responding to the presence of new users in the courts who are
considered undesirable and who present frustrating and unrewarding problems .... These
users are making difficult demands for protection from the courts. Their use of legal insti-
tutions, however, is a response to the new legal entitlements of the 1960's and to the expan-
sion of access to the courts produced by the vigorous legal services and legal advocacy of
the same period.
34. See generally Atiyah, supra note 26, at 1025-28, 1044. But cf D. HARRIS, COMPENSATION
AND SUPPORT FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY 70-76 (1984) (in survey of accident compensation in Eng-
land and Wales, discussing reasons why victinis did not seek damage recoveries, adequacy of social
compensation schemes mentioned in only small fraction of cases).
The possible political phenomenon described in the text may also help explain why much of the
defense of present litigation patterns in recent scholarly literature comes from those whose political
views are generally to the left of the American center. If redistribution by broad legislation has
achieved relatively little success, those whose views ofjustice call for more equality are likely to find
our present unsystematic redistribution via litigation at least a second best worth defending. A na-
tion with substantial inequalities should not expect the redistributive impulse to disappear entirely;
that impulse, if frustrated in the legislative arena, will seek other outlets. See Prichard, Why Is
American Tort Law So Different, in CAUSATION AND FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR CLAIMS OF
PERSONAL INJURY FROM TOXIC CHEMICAL EXPOSURE 359, 364 (1986) (more generous social wel-
fare system treatment for injury in Commonwealth countries than in America "reduces the pressure
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2. Theoretical Perspectives on Dispute Processing. These and
other numerous forces produce a large base of grievances that can ripen
into disputes and lawsuits. The state of knowledge about the processes
that determine to what extent grievances get pursued, and then accepted,
abandoned, settled, or litigated, is not yet highly developed and is indeed
itself the subject of some debate. A leading articulation of the available
theory summarizes:
Attribution theory ... asserts that the causes a person assigns for an
injurious experience will be important determinants of the action he or
she takes in response to it; those attributions will also presumably af-
fect perception of the experience as injurious. People who blame them-
selves for an experience are less likely to see it as injurious, or, having
so perceived it, to voice a grievance about it; they are more likely to do
both if blame can be placed upon another, particularly when the re-
sponsible agent can be seen as intentionally causing or aggravating the
problem .... But attributions themselves are not fixed. As moral
coloration is modified by new information, logic, insight, or experi-
ence, attributions are changed, and they alter the participants' under-
standing of their experience. Adversary response may be an important
factor in this transformation, as may be the nature of the dispute pro-
cess. Some processes, such as counseling, may drain the dispute of
moral content and diffuse responsibility for problems; others, like di-
rect confrontation or litigation, may intensify the disputant's moral
judgment and focus blame. Thus the degree and quality of blame, an
important subject of transformations, also produces further
transformations.
35
Two other students of "dispute transformation" question whether
dispute behavior should be viewed as depending so much upon rational
factors: "Our data suggest that much dispute behavior continues to be
governed by affect, habit, and conceptions of right, appropriateness, or
fittingness that are not subject to rational evaluation but are part of the
taken-for-granted quality of daily life in particular communities. '36
Two empirical studies shed some light on this transformation pro-
cess, focusing particularly on reasons why potential claimants do not
on the tort system to fashion judicially created schemes of distributive justice and permits it to stay
more closely committed to the constraints of corrective justice").
These comments are meant neither as a brief for broader welfare legislation nor to cast doubt on
the motives and conclusions of those who have criticized "litigation explosion" arguments and alter-
native dispute resolution proposals. Rather, it may simply be that any "explosion" of individual and
mass litigation is in part a consequence (and one that should not be surprising) of the policy choice
in favor of limited social benefit schemes.
35. Felstiner, Abel, & Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blam-
ing, Claiming..., 15 LAW & Soc'v REv. 631, 641 (1980-81).
36. Merry & Silbey, What Do Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining the Concept of Dispute, 9 Jusr.
Sys. J. 151, 158 (1984).
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seek legal redress. The Centre for Socio-Legal Studies at Oxford Univer-
sity found that in England and Wales, "only a small minority of all acci-
dent victims initiate legal claims and obtain damages for the losses they
have suffered."' 37 Among those who gave some thought to claiming but
did not even seek legal advice, "[a]n inability or unwillingness to undergo
the possible trouble or bother of making a claim, assumed difficulties in
providing evidence of liability, and fear of legal costs represent the three
most important groups of reasons mentioned. '3 Based on interviews
with American discrimination victims, Johns Hopkins political science
professor Kristin Bumiller found some of the same influences but adds
other possible factors that may inhibit the pursuit of civil rights claims:
The results of my interviews show that people who have experienced
discriminatory treatment resist engagement in legal tactics because
they stand in awe of the power of the law to disrupt their daily lives.
At the same time, they are cynical about the power of the law actually
to help them secure the jobs, housing, and other opportunities they lay
claim to. They fear that, if they seek a legal resolution, they will not
improve their position but will lose control of a hostile situation.
These respondents also feel that asserting their legal rights would not
enable them to express their sense of dignity but would force them to
justify their worthiness against a more powerful opponent. Injured
persons reluctantly employ the label of discrimination because they
shun the role of the victim. Therefore, they chose to rely on strategies
for economic and personal survival that perpetuate their victimization
but are seen as more desirable than submitting to the terms of legal
discourse.3
9
Whatever the ingredients in the process of dispute transformation,
one cross-cultural study of the United States and Australia suggests that
the perceived American uniqueness may be only a matter of relatively
small degree. Although he found somewhat less resort to law and courts
for dispute resolution in Australia, 4° Jeffrey FitzGerald concludes: "The
most significant result to emerge from a comparison of the Australian
and U.S. surveys reported here is the overall similarities of behaviour in
relation to grievance and dispute. ' 4
1
3. Caseload Data. From these many sources flow the streams-
some would say rivers or floods-of disputes that make their way into
our more or less formal dispute processing systems of courts, arbitration,
37. D. HARRIS, supra note 34, at 317.
38. Id. at 71.
39. K. BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS
109 (1988). For a critical review of Bumiller's methodology, see Beer, Book Review, 6 CONST.
COMMENTARY 159 (1989).
40. See FitzGerald, supra note 25, at 42.
41. Id. at 43.
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and other structures. Perhaps surprisingly, even the determination of
caseload volume and growth rate, not to mention its implications, excites
considerable disagreement. 42 Before discussion of the "litigation explo-
sion" controversy it should be useful to lay a common foundation by
setting out the main facts about recent litigation volume trends that ap-
pear to be accepted with relatively little argument.
First, the mix of civil case types has changed over the last several
decades, with commercial cases remaining quite important but not as
dominant as they were in the early years of the century. Tort (particu-
larly automobile) and domestic relations filings increased greatly, albeit
with some recent decline in the relative proportion of tort cases-a prob-
able consequence of no-fault legislation and growth in other parts of the
docket.43 Second, although the proportion of total court expenditures
devoted to the costs of trials is high, courts also do a large amount of
routine processing of uncontested matters.44 Of cases filed in courts, the
large majority-usually at least ninety percent-are resolved without
trial.45 Although it is sometimes loosely stated that the remainder are
settled, in fact a good many are abandoned or, in some cases, disposed of
by judicial action short of trial.
42. See, for example, the sharp exchange between Thomas Marvell, Marvell, Are Caseloads
Really Increasing? Yes.. ., JUDGES' J., at 34 (Summer 1986), and Stephen Daniels, Daniels, Are
Caseloads Really Increasing? Not Necessarily .... JUDGES' J., at 34 (Summer 1986).
43. See CORC REPORT, supra note 23, at 50; see also Daniels, Ladders and Bushes: The Prob-
lem of Caseloads and Studying Court Activities over Time, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 751, 774
("In general, the studies of civil litigation in state trial courts describe a rough pattern of change
from a docket characterized primarily by private, market-oriented matters (e.g., property, contract)
toward one more characterized by nonmarket matters (e.g., tort, family law).") (footnotes omitted).
Since tort claims play a major role in perceptions of a "litigation- explosion," see, eg., Atiyah,
supra note 26, at 1005, the finding of several studies that in recent years tort litigation generally has
been a stable or decreasing portion of the total docket deserves emphasis. See, e.g., CORC REPORT,
supra note 23, at 50; D. HENSLER, M. VAIANA, J. KAKALIK, & M. PETERSON, TRENDS IN TORT
LITIGATION: THE STORY BEHIND THE STATISTICS 11 (1987) [hereinafter TRENDS IN TORT] (auto
accident claims are "steady or declining percentage of total court action," while high-stakes personal
injury and mass latent injury cases have grown); Marvell, Caseload Growth-Past and Future
Trends, 71 JUDICATURE 151, 156 (1987) (growth rate in tort filings in 13 reporting state court
systems during 1976-1986 approximately same as for civil cases generally).
44. Brunet, Measuring the Costs of Civil Justice (Book Review), 83 MICH. L. REv. 916, 936-37
(1985) (reviewing J. KAKALIK & R. Ross, COSTS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: COURT EXPEND-
ITURES FOR VARIOUS TYPES OF CIVIL CASES (1983)). See also Schwartz, The Other Things that
Courts Do, 28 UCLA L. REV. 438 (1981) (discussing nonadjudicative court duties and suggesting
elimination of some, such as appointing other officials and administering estates).
45. See CORC REPORT, supra note 23, at 48 (footnote omitted) ("Some evidence suggests that
of late courts are adjudicating a smaller fraction of the disputes brought to them. The larger portion
are settled."); id. at 54 ("During the period from 1960 to 1980, the proportion of civil cases in the
federal district courts terminated by trials remained relatively stable, declining from 8.4 percent to
6.1 percent of the cases filed. The decline is more apparent than real, reflecting the large numbers of
suits by the government on defaulted loans and social security claims requiring no court action.")
(footnote omitted).
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Finally, it also seems to be common ground that federal court
caseloads have increased disproportionately over the last quarter cen-
tury. As Judge Posner has summarized it:
[T]he number of cases filed in the [federal] district courts more than
tripled [from 1960 to 1983], roughly from 80,000 to 280,000-a 250
percent increase, compared with less than 30 percent in the preceding
quarter-century. The compound annual rate of increase was 5.6 per-
cent-six times the annual rate in the preceding period [1934 to 1960].
Contrary to popular impression, the growth has been larger on the
civil than on the criminal side of the calendar .... 46
The sources of this increase have varied over time and include civil rights
decisions and legislation broadening available actions and remedies, 47 re-
cent government policy decisions resulting in more vigorous pursuit of
debts and stiffer resistance to benefit claims, 4 8 and perhaps a small
number of product liability situations that have produced huge numbers
of claims.49
4. Implications of Caseload Sources. Ideas and information about
the sources of caseloads can have major implications for what, if any-
thing, should be done in response. Viewed from within the dispute
processing system, case flow can seem like an independent variable to
which that system must simply adjust itself as best it can. But from a
broader perspective, the quantities of disputes that make their way to
46. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 63-64 (1985); see also, e.g., J.
LIEBERMAN, supra note 7, at 6 ("The tide of federal cases has been out of all proportion to any
growth in population and reflects the outpouring of congressional enactments from the mid-1960s on
. ...."); Friedman, Courts over Time: A Survey of Theories and Research, in EMPIRICAL THEORIES
ABoUT COURTS 9, 31 (K. Boyum & L. Mather eds. 1983) ("Another piece of evidence is the one
clear-cut 'litigation explosion'-the explosion in federal courts. Federal courts keep better statistics
than state courts, and there is no question that their filings are rising faster than the population is
growing.").
47. See CORC REPORT, supra note 23, at 53 ("Civil rights cases have increased from 142 in
1950 to 17,038 in 1982."); Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis of Federal
District Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 65, 135 (1981) (noting expansion by the
Warren Court of constitutional bases for postconviction challenges by state and federal prisoners);
Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived "Bureaucracy" of the Federal Courts: A Causation-
Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68 IowA L. REv. 871, 896-97 (1983) (at-
tributing rise in federal caseloads in part to increasing litigiousness, "liberal" court decisions creating
new causes of action, and congressional actions expanding federal jurisdiction and creating new
judicial business).
48. Clark, supra note 47, at 144. See also Galanter, supra note 21, at 17 (footnote omitted):
If we break down the overall [123%] increase [in total federal district court filings, 1975-
1984] we notice that the increase in filings over the nine years is heavily concentrated in a
few areas. Indeed, five categories of cases-recovery of overpayments, social security
cases, prisoner petitions, torts, and civil rights cases-account for almost three-quarters of
the entire increase in filings.
Half of the total increase is accounted for by two giant increases-recovery cases and
social security cases. Each is the result of deliberate and calculated official policy ....
49. See Galanter, supra note 21, at 20-26.
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courts and other dispute processors are themselves in major part a varia-
ble dependent on factors outside the system, and different types of re-
sponses can follow from different assessments of what those factors are.
Litigation flows or floods that spring from serious social problems, for
example, are likely to require more than just tinkering with dispute
processing mechanisms, whether the response be substantive legislation,
"structural" judicial remedies, or a decision that the courts are not to
intervene in the area.
Furthermore, information about the extent of caseload growth
problems-often hard to come by, particularly for some state court sys-
tems-can suggest whether the situation is severe enough to call for dras-
tic action. It also can be vital to know whether the sources of caseload
increases are general or concentrated in a few specific areas; when an
increase in cases from mainly one or two sources leads to a general sense
of overload,50 it may sometimes be too easy to overlook the possibility of
targeted responses aimed at particular causes. In Professor Austin
Sarat's words,
[A]rguments which move from the litigiousness and inaccessibility of
justice to proposals for court reform and a reallocation of disputes to
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms need to be more carefully
scrutinized. This does not mean that there are not problems of exces-
sive litigation or inaccessible justice in specific types of disputes. Nev-
ertheless, it cautions that court reform efforts, especially efforts to
promote ADR, need to be more focused and tailored to particular
problem areas.51
5. The "'Litigation Explosion" Controversy. It is in this setting-
the significance, for possible reforms, of caseload data and their evalua-
tion-that the controversy over the existence and extent of a "litigation
explosion" can well be considered. The lines of division have been quite
sharp and the amount of genuine dialogue rather small, with some ob-
servers strongly convinced that general litigiousness, high awards, and
other factors have led to a court-swamping, justice-defeating, unproduc-
tive explosion. Others argue that for the most part our justice systems
are not in such bad shape, or at least that the "litigation explosion"
charge is both unproven and a springboard for hasty, perhaps unneeded,
access-reducing and pro-defendant proposals. 52 Indeed, the arguments
50. See Atiyah, supra note 26, at 1005 ("Complaints about the volume of litigation in America
appear to focus on the volume of tort claims.").
51. Sarat, The Litigation Explosion, Access to Justice, and Court Reform: Examining the Criti-
cal Assumptions, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 319, 335 (1985).
52. Again, it seems to be widely agreed that growth in federal court caseloads has been dispro-
portionate, even after discounting for filings that inflate numbers but have virtually no impact on
judicial workload, such as increased student loan collections. Any uncertainties in that context are
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reveal a reversal of common roles, with some on the left more or less
defending the established order, perhaps from concern that the business
community and conservatives might use "litigation explosion" concerns
to justify restricted access or inferior forms of justice for society's have-
nots.
During the 1970s, assertions of increasing litigiousness and
caseloads went mostly unchallenged. Public figures such as Chief Justice
Burger and commentators like Professor John Barton 53 and Dean Bay-
less Manning 5 4 both reflected and spread the view that a litigation explo-
sion was taking place. In the first half of this decade, however, those
questioning that view had the stage largely to themselves in academic
commentary. The first major challengers, those associated with the Civil
Litigation Research Project (CLRP) based at the University of Wiscon-
sin, remain those whose work is greatest in volume and most significant
in both empirical data and theoretical argument. They have been joined
more recently by Stephen Daniels of the American Bar Foundation
(ABF) and a 1986 report from the National Center for State Courts
(NCSC).
The critics have challenged the "litigation explosion" view on both
factual and evaluative grounds. They have questioned not only whether
litigiousness, caseload backlogs, and costs have been adequately shown to
be as high as is sometimes asserted, but also whether we should be
alarmed even if those measures are indeed quite high by some standards.
The leading attack on the "litigation explosion" view has been Wisconsin
law professor Marc Galanter's 1983 article,"Reading the Landscape of
Disputes," in which he concluded:
I have argued that the hyperlexis reading of the dispute landscape
displays the weakness of contemporary legal scholarship and policy
analysis. We have seen the announcement of general conclusions rele-
vant to policy on the basis of very casual scholarly activity. The infor-
mation base was thin and spotty; theories were put forward without
serious examination of whether they fit the facts; values and precon-
ceptions were left unarticulated. Portentous pron6hncements were
made by established dignitaries and published in learned journals.
Could one imagine public health specialists or poultry breeders conjur-
ing up epidemics and cures with such cavalier disregard of the incom-
pleteness of the data and the untested nature of the theory?55
over sources-general litigiousness or mainly some more specific phenomena, like greater govern-
ment use of the federal courts and a small number of mass claim situations. See supra notes 46-50
and accompanying text.
53. Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 567 (1975).
54. Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 767 (1977),
55. Galanter, supra note 7, at 71.
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a. Volume. Concerning sheer volume of case filings, the NCSC's
1986 study surveyed data from almost half the states and concluded:
A careful examination of available data relating to tort, contract, real
property rights, and small claims cases from a representative group of
state courts provides no evidence to support the often cited existence of
a national "litigation explosion" in the state trial courts during the
1981-84 time period.
There are some state courts that have experienced significant in-
creases in the case types described... but the impact of that finding is
reduced when one realizes that these are the courts in states that have
also experienced significant increases in their total populations.
Changes in the number of these filings are not attributable to an in-
crease in the propensity of the average American to sue, but rather to a
simple increase in the numbers of average Americans.
In a significant number of state courts, selected civil filings have
decreased [during] the period 1981-1984 ....
It may be that there was a litigation explosion that peaked around
1981.56
If there are such peaks and valleys, Stephen Daniels of the ABF
argues that we should neither be surprised nor extrapolate permanently
skyrocketing caseloads even from rather alarming trends. He suggests in
two articles57 that local and jurisdictional factors play a large role in de-
termining caseloads, and that external influences on filing rates often
spend their force and can lead downward as well as up.
These arguments have recently begun to draw responses. Judge
Posner characterizes Galanter's data as "very spotty."' 58 Thomas
Marvell faults the NCSC's 1986 study for basing assertions on the unrep-
resentative 1981-84 period, in which litigation rates could have been ex-
pected not to grow because of bad economic conditions in 1980-82.59 He
contends that more recent and longer-term data show caseload growth
out of proportion to population increases, with filings rising in response
to economic upturns. 60 Marvell also argues that Daniels overlooks the
56. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: AN-
NUAL REPORT 1984, at 173 (1986). The most recent NCSC Annual Report was more guarded:
"Over the 1981-87 period, tort and general civil filings fluctuated.... An underlying upward trend
[in tort filings] is identifiable for some states over the 1981-87 period. No state registered a clear and
consistent downward trend .... [TMhe available evidence does not support conclusions about na-
tional patterns." NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS:
ANNUAL REPORT 1987, at 33 (1989).
57. Daniels, We're Not a Litigious Society, JUDGES' J., Spring 1985, at 18; Daniels, supra note
42.
58. R. POSNER, supra note 46, at 76.
59. Marvell, There Is a Litigation Explosion, NAT'L L.J., May 19, 1986, at 13.
60. Marvell, supra note 43. A follow-up study by the NCSC also suggests somewhat greater
state court caseload growth in 1985 than in the post-recession years of 1981-1984 covered in its
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extent to which jurisdictional changes have given caseload relief to courts
of general jurisdiction and how much litigation already has been diverted
to administrative tribunals. 61 Professor Atiyah's recent article on British
and American tort litigation examines comparative statistics and con-
cludes that volume, cost, and recoveries are considerably greater here.
62
b. Cost. As for problems of excessive cost, no one would deny
that legal costs in some big cases are staggering (although even in such
cases, costs are often not large in relation to the stakes). The work of
CLRP, however, has raised the question whether our vision may be im-
paired by such very prominent lights in the litigation sky.63 In their arti-
cle on The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, Trubek et a. portray the typical
case above the small claim level as still being one for modest stakes-
$10,000 or less. Furthermore, such a case is
procedurally simple and will be settled voluntarily without a verdict or
judgment on the merits. This case will involve some pretrial activity,
but no trial. Each side's lawyer spends about thirty hours on the case,
mostly gathering facts and negotiating a settlement. Judicial involve-
ment, either ruling on motions or rendering judgment, will be rare.
The typical case is a "paying" proposition for the parties.64
Significantly, however, their data
suggest that for cases involving recoveries of under $10,000 the total
legal fees paid by both sides will equal or even exceed the net amounts
recovered by the plaintiff. . . . As limited as our data are, they do
suggest that the concern expressed over the cost of litigation is justified
in the smaller cases.
65
Also, aggregate data compiled in a study for the Rand Institute for Civil
Justice alarmingly indicate that net compensation to injured parties re-
ceiving recoveries in tort cases filed in courts of general jurisdiction
earlier report. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS:
ANNUAL REPORT 1985, at 80 (1987).
61. Marvell, supra note 42, at 43.
62. Atiyah, supra note 26, at 1004-16.
63. Cf TRENDS IN TORT, supra note 43, a recent Rand ICJ study in which Hensler and her co-
authors argue that there now exist three main types of tort litigation, with quite distinct characteris-
tics-routine, most commonly automobile, personal injury claims; higher-stakes personal injury
cases such as malpractice and product liability; and mass latent injury cases, as for asbestos-con-
nected illness. They suggest that the differences are sharp enough to warrant different dispute
processing approaches, such as court-annexed arbitration for routine matters and innovative mecha-
nisms for the high-cost mass latent injury claims. If such distinctions between types of cases can be
successfully drawn in practice, that could help make the possibility of "tracking" attractive as one
response to litigation problems. See infra text accompanying notes 183-90.
64. Costs of Ordinary Litigation, supra note 14, at 84.
65. Id. at 121.
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amounted to barely half of the total of system costs, legal fees, and victim
compensation.
66
c. Evaluative Arguments. The recent criticism of the "litigation
explosion" view has questioned perspectives as well as facts, and suggests
that the widespread perception may rest on overgeneralization from elite
academic, practitioner, and federal judicial positions.67 The criticism
goes on in essence to raise the question: "How much disputing is too
much?" This paper can hardly hope to provide a definitive answer, but it
can suggest several lines of approach to the question.
In brief, it does seem clear that at least in certain systems (such as
the federal courts) and for certain types of claims (such as product liabil-
ity and mass latent injury), there has been rapid growth in civil
caseloads. Assessing whether that growth is in some sense excessive-
and if so how to respond to it-requires looking from various perspec-
tives, identifying sources and causes of the growth, considering the kinds
of problems it may bring about, and reckoning as well the benefits of
litigation. What might be called an "external" perspective emphasizing
sources of caseload growth can provide valuable reminders that however
much Americans may be increasingly or excessively litigious, much of
the growth comes from changes in substantive law and quite possibly
from more injury being suffered in modern society. Along these lines, it
also can be valuable to think about "disaggregating" the sources by
major types of cases; if litigiousness is generally rising, increases should
appear in most major categories-which, from preliminary indications,
they do not.
68
The "transformation" or "victim" perspective emphasized by some
social scientists looks to how much and why those who suffer potentially
compensable injury do or do not seek redress. 69 If many do not, that fact
casts doubt on claims of excessive litigiousness and provides a basis for
arguments that
66. J. KAKALIK & N. PACE, supra note 19, at xiv.
67. See Galanter, supra note 7, at 61 (much of "litigation explosion" view "is the product of a
narrow elite of (mostly federal) judges, professors and deans at eminent law schools, and practition-
ers who practice in large firms and deal with big clients about big cases. Because they are attuned to
the 'top' of the system.., such elites tend to have a limited and spotty grasp of what the bulk of the
legal system is really like."); cf Friedman, supra note 46, at 32 (contending that recent growth in
"monster" federal cases accounts for much talk of a "litigation explosion").
68. See generally Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six; or, the Federal Courts Since the
Good Old Days, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 921 (dividing federal civil caseload into major categories; report-
ing sharp decline since 1960 in percentage share for tort cases, especially routine ones, and surprising
increase for contract filings); supra note 21.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 35-39.
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there may be too little conflict in our society. Many studies are "court-
centered." They assess conflict from the point of view of courts which
perceive their resources to be limited. From this viewpoint, any level
of conflict that exceeds the court's capacities is "too much." Things
look very different, however, if we start with the individual who has
suffered an injurious experience.
70
Developing this view, Professor Sarat argues:
What looks, from the courthouse, like a flood of litigation, appears
rather modest against a backdrop of potential lawsuits.... This is not
to suggest that the courts have not faced a rapidly mounting caseload.
It does, however, call into question whether a mounting caseload rep-
resents a growing proportion of potentially litigable injuries and
events-in which case one could talk meaningfully about a litigation
explosion and an expanded role for courts-or whether it represents a
rather constant response to an increase in the number of litigable inju-
ries or events experienced by the population. If the latter, we are then
witnessing an injury explosion rather than a litigation explosion, and
those who decry an allegedly increased appetite for litigation are, in
effect, blaming the victims.
7'
It is important that those strongly concerned with problems of
caseload volume consider perspectives like Professor Sarat's before con-
cluding that major reforms are needed, and if so, what form the changes
should take. At the same time, one cannot ignore that many state and
federal judges feel strongly that caseload burdens are growing exces-
sively,72 at least in relation to the capacity that courts have or can expect
in the near future. Here a "system" perspective can validly emphasize
the many problems that flow from overloaded dockets; these range from
difficulty in attracting and keeping good judges to delay for litigants,
from rushed assembly-line justice in individual cases to lack of time for
careful deliberation about the crafting of opinions.
Still another perspective can, for lack of a better word, be called
"social" and takes into account the broader costs and benefits of litiga-
tion. We must be willing to consider whether the volume of litigation-
whatever its causes and justifications-is having negative side effects such
70. Felstiner, Abel, & Sarat, supra note 35, at 651.
71. Sarat, supra note 51, at 334-35; see also Abel, The Real Tort Crisis--Too Few Claims, 48
OHIO STATE L.J. 443, 447 (1987):
The real tort crisis is old, not new. It is a crisis of underclaiming rather than overclaiming.
The tort system does not encourage fraud or display excessive generosity but fails to com-
pensate needy, deserving victims. It does not place undue burdens on socially valuable
activities but fails to discourage unreasonable risks. And it does not censure the innocent
but fails to condemn the guilty. The rhetoric of those who deplore the burden of liability
and insurance costs is simply another expression of the conservative backlash of recent
years.
72. See, eg., Edwards, supra note 22, at 285 (expressing frustration at inability of judges at
symposium "to convince the academics of the seriousness of the problem of overload in our case
dockets").
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as lower-quality adjudication, costly "defensive practice" in health care
(and even law practice), inhibited willingness to try potentially produc-
tive innovations, and unavailability of insurance. 7
3
As the quotation from Professor Galanter in the preceding footnote
implies, it is important not to overlook the weights on the benefit side of
the scales. People normally pursue claims out of a sense of injury and
wrong, and although formal litigation is not the only path to justice it
can be an essential backdrop to making less formal paths effective. It
enforces society's substantive norms in the case at hand, often refines and
develops them for the guidance of others, and provides at least some
general deterrent effect.74 It is also usually preferable to the alternative
of self-help.
75
Galanter himself has probably been the most vigorous and articulate
advocate of the benefits of litigation. He has listed "not only benefits to
the winning party (compensation, vindication, etc.), but to the loser (his
'day in court'), to others who might have been victimized by the loser
(through incapacitation, rehabilitation, special deterrence), as well as
73. See, eg., E. McGUIRE, THE IMPACT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY (1988) (reporting Conference
Board survey of corporate CEOs reflecting view that product liability has caused discontinuation of
product lines, failure to introduce new products, and research cutbacks); Priest, The Current Insur-
ance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1521 (1987) (in some instances, such as
intrauterine devices, wine tasting, and day care, "insurers had refused to offer coverage at any pre-
mium, forcing these products and services to be withdrawn from the market"); REPORT OF THE
TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE
CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY (1986); TORT POLICY
WORKING GROUP, AN UPDATE ON THE LIABILITY CRISIS (1987). But see U.S. GENERAL Ac-
COUNTING OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABILITY: EXTENT OF "LITIGATION EXPLOSION" IN FEDERAL
COURTS QUESTIONED (1988) (with respect to product liability litigation, questioning many of Tort
Policy Working Group's methods and conclusions). Galanter questions whether the effects of litiga-
tion should be seen as altogether negative:
[W]e hear much about the deleterious effects of litigation in the large-that it dampens
enterprise, distracts managers, makes doctors practice defensive medicine, increases the
cost of products, keeps useful products off the market, etc. All of these attribute to litiga-
tion a powerful effect not only on the behavior of the immediate parties but on other actors
who respond to the signals that courts broadcast by doing and avoiding and spending what
they otherwise would not have done or avoided or spent. Are all of these ramifying effects
on conduct undesirable, so that we should account them as costs? Or should some of them
be accounted as benefits?
Galanter, supra note 21, at 29.
74. See, eg., Alschuler, supra note 31, at 1813 ("Subsidized private litigation can benefit the
public, not only by creating benchmarks that promote the settlement of disputes, but also by per-
suading potential wrongdoers that the violation of rights is likely to be unprofitable.") (footnote
omitted).
75. See id. at 1816.
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effects on wider audiences (general deterrence, moral validation, channel-
ing, habituation... ).,,76
Professor Laura Macklin of Georgetown, in an article that questions
some current emphases on promoting settlements, 77 notes a further set of
benefits of litigation-those that flow from judicial factfinding. In addi-
tion to the traditional use of factfinding as a basis for decision in an indi-
vidual case, she argues:
[F]act gathering and judicial fact determinations often provide both
trial and appellate courts with a set of facts upon which to base consti-
tutional and statutory interpretation, and upon which to premise the
development of common law principles.... [Judicial fact determina-
tions often provide members of the public, and other private and pub-
lic entities, with a source of tested information.
78
Speaking more broadly, Galanter sums up in philosophical terms
some of the virtues of having claims pursued through litigation. He ar-
gues that the "view of litigation as a destructive force, undermining other
social institutions," is
misleadingly one-sided. If litigation marks the assertion of individual
will, it is also a reaching out for communal help and affirmation. If
some litigation challenges accepted practice, it is an instrument for
testing the quality of present consensus. It provides a forum for mov-
ing issues from the realm of unilateral power into a realm of public
accountability.79
d. Conclusion. It may seem anticlimactic to arrive at the end of
considerable discussion of the "litigation explosion" controversy without
a firm conclusion. Much of the foregoing survey, however, illustrates the
several reasons why it appears difficult, even unwarranted, to pronounce
a broad, clear verdict. Some aspects of the picture do stand out: Tort
litigation almost certainly plays a larger role in America than in other
industrialized democracies, at least partly because of less comprehensive
social insurance. Federal court civil dockets have increased dramatically
over the last few decades, but recently tort filings have not been a rising
portion of federal civil caseloads. A substantial fraction of recent federal
76. Galanter, The Radiating Effects of Courts, in EMPIRICAL THEORIES ABOUT COURTS 117,
135 (K. Boyum & L. Mather eds. 1983); see also Galanter, supra note 21, at 28-37 (giving illustra-
tions of benefits of litigation in form of parties' and others' changed attitudes and behavior, and
discussing research on impacts of judicial decisions).
77. Macklin, Promoting Settlement, Foregoing the Facts, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE
575 (1986).
78. Id. at 583.
79. Galanter, supra note 7, at 70; see also Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085
(1984) (job of judicial officials "is not to maximize the ends of private parties, nor simply to secure
the peace, but to explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the
Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord with them").
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filing increases, moreover, has resulted from government policy deci-
sions. Partly because of incomplete statistics, the overall landscape is less
clear for state court systems. In any event, caseload trends-although
apparently rising at least somewhat above population growth-are far
from being entirely uniform in the direction of greater litigiousness, and
it is important to disaggregate the totals to seek sources of major
changes. Finally, any actions that may be taken in response to litigation
problems must proceed with a sense of the goals to be sought and the
constraints that may affect the feasibility of possible reforms-the sub-
jects of the next part.
III. PROCEDURAL VALUES, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL
CONSTRAINTS ON CHANGE
In the context of a study about, in a broad sense, procedural law
reform, three analytically separable themes seem to warrant some
amount of joint discussion. The values and goals that civil dispute reso-
lution processes should serve are important in their own right but often
underlie existing mechanisms as well. Especially to the extent that the
values are widely shared, they also can channel, inhibit, or promote vari-
ous changes. Existing legal practices and institutions can contribute to
the problems discussed above as well as develop constituencies of their
own beneficiaries and users, not to mention opponents. Both interest
groups and social attitudes (such as widespread support for the civil jury
or reluctance to fund major court expansion) similarly affect the feasibil-
ity of possible reform measures.
A. Procedural Values and Goals.
Identifying the major ends we seek to achieve through civil dispute
processing is, of course, fundamental to thinking about possible reforms.
It is difficult to consider fully the values underlying the desirable charac-
teristics of a procedural system in fairly brief form. Whereas it may be
easy to enumerate several values, difficulties lie in trying to classify them,
to reckon how much they are likely to come into conflict, and to say how
to deal with the tradeoffs among them when they do. A worthwhile and
familiar starting point is the basic list of criteria in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 1 and many parallel state provisions, that the rules be "con-
strued to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action." "Justice," in this connection, presumably includes fairness in
treatment of the litigants, accuracy in factfinding, and decision in accord
with applicable norms. Speed and low cost emphasize somewhat more
instrumental goals and efficiency concerns-which immediately raises
Vol. 1989:824]
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- questions about how to deal with tradeoffs between fairness and effi-
ciency. Trying to answer theses questions proves difficult, however, since
the characteristics of "fairness" have often not been specified with much
exactness; in an era of emphasis on law-and-economics thinking, fairness
concerns might be too readily submerged for their relative lack of
precision.
As a rough approximation, and with the acknowledgment that spe-
cific values often could fit under more than one rubric, this section will
discuss procedural goals under three headings: concerns of dispute
processing system users, emphasizing fairness and the resolution of dis-
putes; goals of system administration, stressing efficiency; and concerns
for how well procedural systems serve the ends of substantive justice
through accurate factfinding and enforcement of applicable rights and
other norms.
80
A noncontroversial aspect of fairness in contested actions is,
presumably, an impartial decisionmaker. 81 But to take advantage of
such a decisionmaker, a party must of course have effective access to
dispute resolution processes. 82 And once parties are in court or before
another adjudicator, fairness seems to require some measure of equality
in their ability to present their cases. 83 It also seems to be true in West-
ern cultures that to accord with popular expectations-and thus to be
80. Two articles, one by Professors Robert Baruch Bush of Hofstra Law School and one by
Judith Resnik of the University of Southern California Law Center offer fuller discussions and more
elaborate classifications of procedural goals. Bush lists what he argues are the main aims of the civil
justice system: efficient resource allocation, social justice, protecting fundamental rights, preserving
public order, fostering human relations, maintaining legitimacy, and efficient judicial administration.
Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goals of Civil Justice: Jurisdictional Principles for
Process Choice, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 893, 908-21. One value he stresses-fostering human relations-
is of particular concern to many in the alternative dispute resolution movement, for a common
criticism of our conventional dispute processing systems is that they exact too high a toll in stress
and antagonism between the parties. Resnik classifies "valued features" in American procedure into
those for litigants-their autonomy and persuasion opportunities; for decisionmakers--concentra-
tion of some power along with its diffusion and reallocation, impartiality and visibility, rationality
and norm enforcement, and ritual and formality; and for decisionmaking-economy, finality along
with "revisionism" to correct error, and consistency along with "differentiation" to account for rele-
vant differences. Resnik, supra note 11, at 845-59.
81. See, ag., Tyler, supra note 11, at 128 (finding decisionmakers' "ethicality, honesty, and the
effort to be fair" to be among factors most strongly weighed in citizens' evaluations of process
fairness).
82. Cf Wade, On Frivolous Litigation: A Study of Tort Liability and Procedural Sanctions, 14
Ho sTRA L. REv. 433, 434 n.1 (1986) ("most state constitutions have provisions commanding open
access to the courts").
83. See ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON THE TORT LIABILITY SYsTEM, TOWARDS A JURISPRU-
DENCE OF INJURY: THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN
AMERICAN TORT LAW, at 8-8 to 8-9 (1984) (noting agreement between defenders and critics of
adversary system "'that adequate resources [should] be made available to all litigants'" (quoting J.
THIBAUT & L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 119 (1975))); cf M. DAMASKA, supra note 24, at
PATHS TO A "BETTER WA Y"
perceived as fair and worthy of acceptance-dispute resolution mecha-
nisms must give a considerable measure of control over the presentation
of their cases to the parties themselves, rather than to the adjudicator. 84
Yet honoring these values threatens to lead to cumbersome
processes that can jeopardize the important system administration goals
of speed and efficiency-and even fairness to those litigants forced to
wait or to spend incommensurate amounts on their disputes (or settle
them on disadvantageous terms to avoid cost and delay).8 5 And since
society is unlikely to spend the resources necessary to avoid all such un-
fairness, it seems inevitable to proceed from an acceptance of processes
that do not measure up to the ideal in all respects. Similarly, efforts to
achieve speed and efficiency, especially when backlog problems are se-
vere, can threaten the extent to which procedures are able to serve sub-
stantive justice through accuracy in factfinding and application of
norms.86 To give one final example of conflicting goals, user satisfaction
through settlement or use of alternative dispute resolution procedures
may clash with concerns for substantive justice through norm application
and generation. Thus the problem of possible tradeoffs among competing
values is always present, and it becomes important to ask both how much
such tradeoffs may be necessary87 and how to approach them when they
must be made.
Obviously such large and general questions do not lend themselves
to ready answers, but two significant articles illustrate how discussion of
reconciling procedural goals can become somewhat more specific. Pro-
fessor Tom Tyler of the Departments of Psychology and Political Science
103 ("[ vhatever else the idea of fairness might require ... it surely entails arrangements intended
to afford equal chance of victory to the contestants.... In short, the perennial problem in regulating
the conflict-solving process is to balance the advantages of litigants to provide them with equal
weapons.").
84. See Walker & Thibaut, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CALIF. L. Rav. 541, 566 (1978) (empiri-
cal studies indicate that most satisfactory form of process in largest number of legal disputes "assigns
maximum process control to the disputants, but assigns decision control to a third party").
85. Alschuler, for example, lists the "sources of unfairness that currently infect the settlement
of civil lawsuits" as:
first, the quantitative inadequacy of our adjudicative services; second (a closely related
phenomenon), the complexity of our trial and pretrial procedures; third, the substantive
uncertainty created by our inadequately law-bound system of jury trials; fourth, the exer-
tion of direct judicial pressure to settle; and fifth, the ability of disputants to encourage
settlement by driving up their opponents' costs.
Alschuler, supra note 31, at 1821-22.
86. At least two other substantive justice concerns not yet mentioned deserve weight in evaluat-
ing and designing procedural systems: adequacy of remedies and their enforcement, and generation
of useful precedent. To some extent they are part of goals already mentioned-adequate remediation
is plainly vital to users-but they also stand enough on their own to warrant mention.
87. See, ag., Resnik, supra note 11, at 844 ('[E]mploying the justice/efficiency dichotomy may
misleadingly suggest that the two themes are distinct and always at odds.").
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at Northwestern University has recently reported on a survey of what
criteria citizens regard as important in assessing the fairness of proce-
dures in their encounters with legal authorities. He reports that two im-
portant factors-the ethical, honest, and dedicated effort on the part of
the decisionmaker to be fair, and citizen participation or representation
in the proceedings 88-appear to correlate positively with other values
such as perceived accuracy of the decision. "Procedures that are viewed
as leading to higher quality decisions... are also more ethical and allow
more citizen input." Thus, "the choice of procedures for resolving dis-
putes..., does not require making the trade-offs discussed in the litera-
ture on distributive justice."
'89
Not all tradeoff problems, of course, can be avoided. A major con-
tribution to the debate over tradeoffs between fairness and efficiency is an
article by Second Circuit Judge Jon Newman, in which he argues that we
should think less in terms of fairness in individual cases and more in
terms of the aggregate effects of our procedural practices. 90 His
argument raises in another form the issue of how to balance concerns of
fairness and efficiency. He examines the extent to which the balance
should be struck on the level of the individual case or on that of the
system as a whole-that is, how much will simplified procedures serve
our ideas of justice and due process in the aggregate, even if they detract
from the thoroughness with which justice is served in individual cases?
His article underscores how, again, insistence on near-ideal justice in par-
ticular cases or situations may overlook not just resource constraints in
general but also side effects on other cases, running the risk of making
the perfect the enemy of the good. As Professor Donald Elliott of Yale
has put it, "Nourishing the fiction that justice is a pearl beyond price has
its own price." 91
88. See Tyler, supra note 11, at 106, 128, 131.
89. Id at 131.
For an exhaustive survey and sophisticated synthesis of the social science literature on proce-
dural justice, see E. LIND & T. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988).
The authors emphasize the finding that people seem to be "much more concerned with the process of
their interaction with the law and much less concerned with the outcome of that interaction than one
might have supposed." Id at 92. They address some specific problems of process design to mini-
mize tradeoff problems, such as hybrid procedures to retain the benefits of the adversary model
without its shortcomings, id at 117, and court-annexed arbitration schemes designed to minimize
the danger of providing what would be perceived as "second-class justice," id. at 124-27.
90. Newman, supra note 2.
91. Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 306, 321
(1986) (footnote omitted).
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B. Legal Institutions and Practices.
Earlier sections discussed caseload growth, its sources, and evalua-
tive issues. In addition to problems resulting from the sheer number of
disputes, the ways in which a system treats them can speed or retard the
flow and affect volume, cost, backlog-and results. This subsection
briefly raises some prominent features of civil procedure in most Ameri-
can courts of general jurisdiction and suggests that they contribute signif-
icantly to our perceived problems. That suggestion does not imply that
these devices should be abolished or drastically modified; they often serve
important values, as does the jury by assuring popular involvement in the
administration of justice. Indeed, recognizing that many litigation
problems stem in part from institutions that would be difficult or undesir-
able to discard can be a crucial step toward choosing intelligently how to
respond-whether it means accepting that the problems seem inevitable
given the importance of the values the problem-causing devices serve, or
approaching the problems from different angles, or even concluding that
a long-term attack on a deeply rooted institution may be needed. Three
characteristics of American civil procedure seem most significant for
problems of volume, cost, and delay: (1) litigation finance arrange-
ments-in particular, the American rule on attorney fee liability, the
contingent fee, and the lack of cost-based court user fees; (2) broad, ad-
versary-initiated discovery; and (3) the nature of American court deci-
sionmaking, with its heavy reliance on juries and a fairly heterogeneous
corps of judges.
1. Litigation Finance Practices. In brief, the American system of
litigation finance that governs in most actions facilitates court access for
damage plaintiffs in all but small claim cases. The rarity of fee awards
against losing plaintiffs probably deters weak claims less than British and
Continental loser-pays approaches would, 92 and the generally token size
of most American courts' filing fees also works to make access easy.9
3
The contingent fee, even if it reduces net recoveries and gives lawyers an
incentive to avoid weak cases, on balance probably encourages damage
claims of medium and greater size or strength.94 In effect, a contingency
fee gives the damage plaintiff a risk-bearing co-venturer in the person of
92. See, eg., Rowe, Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter 1984, at 139, 150 ("A standard objection to the American rule is that contrast to English-
style fee shifting, it does not provide enough disincentive to nuisance litigation.").
93. In many European nations, however, the absence of these access-facilitating American
practices is probably offset by lower attorney fees and more comprehensive legal aid programs.
94. See generally Atiyah, supra note 26, at 1017 (comparing the American system with the




the lawyer who will not get paid in case of defeat. The next effect of
these several American litigation finance practices, compared to those in
most other industrialized democracies, is probably to encourage pursuit
of claims generally (except for strong small or nonmonetary ones) and to
provide less discouragement for somewhat risky or novel claims.
95
Although modified in important and increasingly numerous in-
stances, the American rule generally denying fee recovery is part of a
setting that emphasizes not placing too much inhibition (however much
that might be) on access to justice and that includes the contingent per-
centage fee for plaintiffs' damage suits. The constraint is not that the
American rule cannot be modified; it already has been in many instances
and for diverse reasons. 96 The changes that have taken place in the
American rule, however, are mostly consistent with avoiding severe inhi-
bitions on plaintiffs' access to justice, since they usually have involved
one-way pro-prevailing-plaintiff rules,97 sanctions against frivolous
claims or defenses or litigation misconduct, 98 and two-way shifting only
when sides are already equal or to equalize an existing imbalance.99
What seems unlikely-for better or worse-is adoption of the English
loser-pays approach (although it does exist, more or less, in Alaska'00),
or perhaps any changes that would generally threaten with an adverse fee
shift the good-faith plaintiff who has a claim of at least moderate
strength.101
2. Broad, Adversary-Led Discovery. At least in cases that are
fairly large and seriously contested, American discovery practice often
adds significantly to cost and delay. The problem is only partly the idea
of open discovery itself, with the possibility it creates for expensive and
protracted pretrial proceedings. Magistrate Wayne Brazil identifies a
95. See Prichard, supra note 34, at 362-63.
96. See, eg., Rowe, The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: 4 Critical Overview, 1982
DUKE L.. 651.
97. See Note, State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes: Are We Quietly Repealing the American
Rule?, LAW & CoNTEMp. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 321, 330-32.
98. See eg., 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982) (attorney liability for excess costs, expenses, and attorney
fees incurred because of unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of proceedings); FED. R. CIV. P.
11.
99. See Rowe, supra note 96, at 664-65 n.63.
100. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.010 (Supp. 1989); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82. See generally Com-
ment, Award of Attorney's Fees in Alaska: An Analysis of Rule 82, 4 UCLA-ALASKA L. Rav. 129
(1974).
101. See, eg., Simon, The Riddle ofRule 68, 54 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 1, 75 (1985) ("The Ameri-
can Rule is predicated on the policy that anyone with a meritorious claim has the right to go to trial
undeterred by the prospect of paying the opponent's attorney's fees if he refuses to settle or if the suit
is unsuccessful.").
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tension that compounds difficulties: "Minimal reflection reveals a funda-
mental antagonism between the goal of truth through disclosure and the
protective and competitive impulses that are at the center of the tradi-
tional adversary system of dispute resolution." 10 2 A predictable result of
this tension between the ideal of open discovery and adversarial incen-
tives is a high level of contention about discovery matters.
Discovery is probably just one of the most prominent examples of
how issues relating to the adversary system bear on what reforms would
be desirable and possible. The system serves many important values,
such as litigant satisfaction through participation and control of case
presentation, and more debatably the search for truth; it also can exacer-
bate antagonisms and create openings for gamesmanship. 10 3 The adver-
sary system has strong defenders and critics; among the critics, Professor
John Langbein of the University of Chicago Law School argues with par-
ticular relevance to discovery that "by assigning judges rather than law-
yers to investigate the facts, the [West] Germans avoid the most
troublesome aspects of our practice." 10 4 Such judicial fact-gathering
probably would require considerably more judge-power than American
systems now provide; 0 5 but a major change like moving from judicial
control over pretrial fact-gathering to judicial conduct of the discovery
process might be so contrary to heavily entrenched adversary norms as to
be politically infeasible. 10 6 Such possible hurdles standing in the way of a
fairly radical reform measure, whatever its desirability,10 7 illustrate the
important issue whether we are in some respects confined to rearranging
102. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31
VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1299 (1978); see also Note, Discovery Abuse Under the Federal Rules: Causes
and Cures, 92 YALE L.J. 352 (1982).
103. For an excellent collection of views on the adversary system, see S. LANDSMAN, READINGS
ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO LITIGATION (1988). For a shorter
summary of the system's strengths and weaknesses, see ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON THE TORT LIA-
BILITY SYSTEM, supra note 83, at 8-1 to 8-14.
104. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 823, 824 (1985).
105. See Galanter, supra note 7, at 55 (number of judges in America is relatively small in com-
parison to other nations).
106. See also Plett, Civil Justice and Its Reform in West Germany and the United States, 13 JUST.
Sys. J. 186, 198-99 (1988-89) (expressing doubt whether "civil procedure in West Germany and the
United States provides fertile ground for cross-national imitation" because procedural purposes and
practices differ so substantially, and stressing need to take into account "respective conditions fram-
ing the legal profession as a whole" before attempting reforms transplanting specific procedures into
context of different legal system).
107. A key unresolved issue bearing on the desirability and feasibility of Langbein's proposal in
the American context is whether party control is as important for litigant satisfaction with respect to
fact-gathering as it seems to be for case presentation at trial. See supra note 84 and accompanying
text; cf E. LIND & T. TYLER, supra note 89, at 86-87 (describing studies indicating that process
control preferences can be "subdivided," with high acceptance of hybrid procedure keeping much
control over presentation of evidence and arguments in hands of adversaries while allowing greater-
than-usual initiative by judge to ask questions and seek clarification).
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the deck chairs on the Titanic. That may be the case if a major practice
or institution is both inextricably rooted and a significant contributor to
litigation problems.
3. The Civil Jury. Probably the single legal institution with the
most far-reaching effects for purposes of this study is the civil jury. In
both fundamental law and popular attitudes in this country, it seems to
be such a fixture that extended discussion here of its pros and cons would
be pointless. And even if a quite small fraction of cases actually go to
trial before a jury, the impact of having juries may be more pervasive and
widespread than is sometimes perceived. The introduction of a regularly
changing decisionmaking group reduces expertise and predictability of
verdicts, thereby injecting an element of uncertainty that diminishes the
ease with which parties can agree on settlement terms before trial.108
The existence of the civil jury also necessitates single-event trials
rather than the sort of serial trial used in some Continental nations, with
discovery and the judicial taking of evidence handled together but in a
series of meetings with judge and parties that can be dispersed over
time.109 Concentrated trials increase the need in America for extensive
pretrial preparation procedures, whose existence affects not only cases
that do end up at trial but can add to expense and delay in the large
108. See, eg., Alschuler, supra note 31, at 1822 (referring to "the substantive uncertainty cre-
ated by our inadequately law-bound system of jury trials"); Atiyah, Lawyers and Rules: Some An.
glo-American Comparisons, 37 Sw. L.J. 545, 555 (1983):
There is no question that English trial judges are ... more rule-governed than American
trial judges; but, in addition, the continued use of the civil jury in America makes the
American trial a totally different exercise from the English trial. Trial by judge is just not
the same thing as trial by jury. Judges give reasons for their decisions, juries do not; judges
cannot openly discard or flout the law, juries can; judges at least attempt to put aside
prejudice and emotion, juries often do not. Nobody can doubt that jury trial is a less rule-
governed and less predictable mode of trial than judge trial.
The use and unpredictability of juries may contribute to higher verdicts, see id. at 556, and
make it harder to reach settlements, at least unless a party is highly risk averse, as uncertainty makes
it easier for the adversaries to retain divergent expectations of the outcome of trial.
Alschuler proposes to address the problem of "lawless damage awards" "through the establish-
ment of 'damages commissions' and 'damages guidelines.' Jurors could then receive at least as much
guidance in awarding damages as they currently receive in determining liability." Alschuler, supra
note 31, at 1826 (footnote omitted).
109. See, eg., M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 109 (1980) (referring to dispersion of trial hear-
ings over time in France and Holland); Langbein, supra note 104, at 826-31 (surveying West Ger-
man civil procedure including episodic "conference method" of adjudication). Interestingly,
however, West Germany found its serial trial system too time-consuming and has attempted to move
toward a more Anglo-American form of single trial in a major reform of its code of civil procedure.
See, eg., R. TROrr, GERMANY: PRACTICAL LEGAL GUIDE ON COSTS AND FEES, COURT PRO-
CEEDINGS AND COMMERCIAL LAW 31, 34 (1977) (discussing new procedure to include pleadings
and discovery in a single hearing); von Mehren, Some Comparative Reflections on First Instance Civil
Procedure: Recent Reforms in German Civil Procedure and in the Federal Rules, 63 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 609, 614-22 (1988) (detailed discussion of workings of post-reform German system of less
discontinuous trials).
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majority that do not. The jury is also a main reason for many exclusion-
ary evidence rules, and its selection and presence add to the time and
expense of actual trial. 110 Even when many of the streamlining reforms
tried and proposed in recent years, like court-annexed arbitration, pre-
serve the ultimate right to trial by jury, they attempt to do away with
many of its consequences by such steps as abbreviating pretrial proce-
dures, relaxing the rules of evidence, or providing juries with damages
guidelines.
Any one of these three major characteristics of American proce-
dural systems could lead to problems. Together, especially in many cases
of significant scale, they can interact to multiply difficulties. If claims are
fairly easy to pursue because of financing practices, if litigation becomes
complicated by extensive discovery and the parties' strategic behavior,
and if cases sometimes prove unpredictable and fairly hard to settle, then
the result is likely to be a good deal of expensive, protracted litigation.
C. Social Constraints on Change.
Various aspects of the social and political setting constrain the
amount and nature of changes that are possible in the way disputes are
handled in America. The historic tendency to judicialize many social
and political issues, for example, probably can be curbed only to a mod-
erate degree even in an age of judicial restraint. For one thing, reflecting
the dispersion of authority in American government, some state court
systems are likely to remain activistI '-with whatever contribution that
makes to "litigation explosion" problems-even if the federal courts
become much less so. Moreover, interest groups ranging from the busi-
ness sector to the public interest law movement, the organized bar, and
even the judiciary itself"12 have important concerns that cannot be ig-
nored in considering possible changes. Indeed, present arrangements
110. See, eg., H. ZEISEL, H. KALVEN, JR., & B. BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT 71-81
(1959) (estimating possible forty percent saving of trial time if bench trials replaced jury trials).
Professor Hazard's review of the Zeisel, Kalven, and Buehholz book argued that there were reasons
to expect that the savings might be considerably greater. Hazard, Book Review, 48 CALIF. L. REv.
360, 369-70 (1960).
111. See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977) (lauding the tendency of state courts to protect individual rights under
state law beyond requirements of federal Constitution).
112. See, eg., Hazard, Court Delay: Toward New Premises, 5 Civ. JusT. Q. 236, 240 (1986):
[S]tronger administrative control over the use of time by judges and court officials..
conflicts with the self-interest of judges and court officials in maintaining their autonomy.
But this self-interest is supported by considerations of constitutional principle, the principle
of judicial autonomy in decision-making.... [I]n operation autonomy in decision-making
conflicts with the principle of subordination in administration. Judges who are self-indul-




with all their problems may often be the products of delicate accommo-
dations of conflicting interests that would be difficult to disturb.
To point out that various factors act as constraints on change is not
necessarily to lament their effect, or even to imply that they always will
inhibit reforms rather than advance them. Social institutions and atti-
tudes that impede some possible reforms often reflect important values.
We cannot afford to honor literally, for example, the sentiment that
everyone deserves a "day in court," at least in the sense of a full jury
trial. Yet the belief can appropriately check measures that would elimi-
nate court access altogether or reduce it too sharply, and serve as a re-
minder of the importance of providing some form of impartial and
effective hearing. Moreover, sometimes attitudes themselves can facili-
tate or channel reform when existing practices fail to measure up. The
sense that "justice delayed is justice denied," for example, is a common
thread among a large number of efforts (many of them controversial' 13)
at streamlining case handling; and concerns about limiting access to jus-
tice can support refining of litigation finance measures so that they filter
claims rather than inhibiting them generally.
The combination of social and political setting, legal institutions and
interest groups, and process concerns helps make it more understandable
why major reforms that could make a substantial dent on the "litigation
problem" will often be very difficult to adopt and implement. Moreover,
the multiplicity of sources and causes makes it highly unlikely that any
single change would have a great and lasting impact; we cannot expect
quick fixes. And even radical improvements, should any be achieved,
may have only passing effect; if the judicial wheel were to become less
squeaky, it might get less oil for so long as to let it become rusty again. 114
Such is likely to be the fate of measures that merely reduce or shift
caseloads, however useful or otherwise justified they may be. These
comments are not to suggest that no significant improvements can be
accomplished, but rather to give a realistic sense of the difficulty of major
reform in dispute processing" 5 and why the changes that can be effected
may well be fairly marginal. And they provide background for the effort
to think about which kinds of "paths to a 'better way'" are likely to be
most promising, which is the question addressed in the remainder of this
paper.
113. See, eg., Sarokin, Justice Rushed Is Justice Ruined, 38 RUTGERS L. REv. 431 (1986).
114. Cf Banks, Keynote Address, 6 ALTERNATIVES 57, 58 (1988) (noting problems of cost,
backlog, and delay in Australia and New Zealand despite absence of jury trials and contingent fees,
and use of fee shifting).
115. See A. VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION XiX (1949)
("Manifestly judicial reform is no sport for the short-winded or for lawyers who are afraid of tempo-
rary defeat.").
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IV. PATHS AND SIDETRACKS: A PRELIMINARY SKETCH
A. Introduction.
With the foregoing landscape as a setting for efforts at reform, we
can begin to consider the major paths to possible improvement. Lists
and classifications abound in the literature;1 16 rarely is a major path an
entirely novel or untried idea.117 The situation is somewhat like that of
trying to deal with road traffic; depending on problems, resources, goals,
and assessments of likely results, one may build more roads, improve
existing ones, restrict traffic, require detours, levy tolls, relax or enforce
speed limits, emphasize driver training, promote mass transit, provide
bicycle paths, or even try to make trips unnecessary (or pointless).
The "more roads" alternative-more courts and judges-is often
necessary, particularly to keep pace with population growth, but is un-
likely to suffice as a major response to litigation cost and delay because
the judicial system must continually compete with other claimants for
scarce public resources. Since court expansion helps only until caseloads
grow again, it seems not to be the most productive use of a transitory
political will for court reform. Moreover, as adding superhighways can
encourage people to drive more, adding trial judges may induce some-
what more filings.118 And increasing the number of judgeships comes
with costs of its own in bureaucratization and loss of collegiality and
prestige. 19
116. See, eg., Hazard, supra note 112, at 237:
On closer examination, all standard remedies for court delay necessarily reduce themselves
to one of two basic measures. The first is to increase the supply of adjudicative resources
by creating more courts, more judges, larger clerical staff, etc. The second is to decrease
the demand on existing adjudicative resources by reducing either the number of cases re-
ceived or the scope of the consideration given to the average case.
See also Rosenberg, Can Court-Related Alternatives Improve Our Dispute Resolution System?, 69
JUDICATURE 254, 254 (1986) ("Basically there are three routes by which to improve the dispute
resolution system: changing the [substantive or procedural] law, channeling disputes to non-adjudi-
cative tribunals, and using alternatives as court-related mechanisms.").
117. See, eg., Hazard, supra note 112, at 238-39:
[C]onventional reforms for systemic court delay.., do not necessarily entail radical types
of remedial measures.... The method of achieving radical reform is not that of discover-
ing presently unimagined techniques, but of discovering how to orchestrate a new combi-
nation of presently obvious techniques.
118. See Marvell, supra note 27, at 156:
Apparently, trial court filings increase because new judgeships lead litigants to expect
speedier decisions .... [H]owever, adding new judgeships does not result in a correspond-
ingly large increase in filings.... Adding new judgeships is not self defeating, although the
impact is often blunted by new cases attracted.
119. For perspective, it bears noting that the number of judges in relation to population and to
the number of lawyers in the United States is apparently fairly small. See Galanter, supra note 7, at
55. Such comparisons, however, can be treacherous because of different national patterns in the
performance of adjudicative functions by administrative judges, private arbitrators, etc.
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There are so many ways to approach dispute processing problems
that it seems necessary to mention several paths but at the same time
difficult to consider them all in depth. The remainder of this part will
discuss briefly three approaches that deserve some discussion but are not
the main focus of this study-the impacts of the form and content of
substantive law; the use of administrative proceedings; and the role of
lawyers' professional responsibility. Later parts will then treat in more
detail other interrelated paths that may be the most worthy of further
exploration in the context of this study-procedural rule reforms, litiga-
tion finance measures, and alternative dispute resolution.
B. Paths Not Emphasized.
1. Interrelations Between Substance and Dispute Processing. Dis-
pute processing systems of course exist not for their own sake but rather
(to oversimplify) to do justice, serve disputants, and enforce society's
norms. This study's focus on the procedural side, broadly defined, is not
to imply a primary role for procedure itself. Substantive law reform is
the focus of other ALI studies such as the project on Compensation and
Liability for Product and Process Injuries, whose work this study seeks
not to duplicate. Still, the significance of several aspects of substantive
law for dispute processing warrants further mention. Without attempt-
ing an exhaustive list, this subsection briefly discusses several of the sig-
nificant impacts. At opposite but related poles,120 substance can virtually
remove possible claims from disputing by denying them totally (for ex-
ample, rent decontrol), thereby leaving their resolution to private order-
ing (the market, contracting, unilateral decisions); or granting them
automatically (as by outlawing literacy tests as a precondition to vot-
ing).121 And lest we overlook one of the basic goals of substantive law-
making, it can reduce at least some forms of disputing if it actually has a
major impact on an underlying problem that is a source of claims. 2
2
Perhaps reflecting only a difference of degree from automatic grant-
ing of claims, substantive entitlements can be defined in ways that
120. The poles are related because the substantive measures in question usually amount to the
abolition of a claim (rent control entitlement) on the one hand and of a defense (illiteracy, contribu-
tory negligence) on the other.
121. For analysis of a more far-reaching example-New Zealand's replacement of much private
tort law with public compensation for even nontortious accidental injury--see Brown, Deterrence in
Tort and No-Fault: The New Zealand Experience, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 976, 982-84 (1985); McLean,
Accident Compensation Liability Without Fault-The New Zealand Experience, 1985 J. Soc. WEL-
FARE L. 31.
122. Such would be the case, for example, with effective transportation safety regulation that
reduced mass disasters and consequent litigation. Ineffective enforcement, of course, as with Prohi-
bition or modem drug laws, can have much less than its intended impact and lead to much collateral
disputing such as suppression motions, trials, and asset seizure efforts.
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attempt to minimize likely disputing. For example, legislatures can elim-
inate a major dispute-generating element (as with no-fault insurance123
and divorce) or define eligibility criteria in bright-line terms (for example,
payability of Social Security retirement benefits at a certain age).124
Moreover, the sharpness of the lines drawn for substantive purposes can
be affected by what enforcement mechanisms are available in connection
with a regime of substantive entitlements, with consequent effects on set-
tlement rates and the level of appeals (for example, ordinary court trial,
normally by jury, for FELA cases125 versus specialized administrative
processing of workers' compensation claims). The predictability of sub-
stantive law can influence greatly the sharpness of the "shadow of the
law" in which disputants bargain and dictate their decisions on settle-
ment. The ease of applying bright line rules, of course, does not mean
that such rules are always possible or desirable; we probably would not
want a maximum age for driver's licenses, at least not one that would
exclude a good many drivers.
The impacts of substance can come in somewhat more subtle ways.
It can affect incentives to start litigation at all and to litigate more or less
tenaciously, as with the size of awards allowed (for example, punitive or
treble damages); it also can influence the attractiveness of delay (as by
award or denial of prejudgment or postjudgment interest). Finally, the
causal connection can sometimes run from dispute processing practices
to substance rather than the other way around: courts may use substan-
tive rules to circumvent or reduce undesirable effects of procedural rules
(for example, questionably generous damage rules as ways to get around
the American Rule denying attorney fee awards1 26). The circumventions
(viz. punitive damages) can themselves engender considerable litigation.
123. See CORC REPORT, supra note 23, at 112-13 (discussing economies from eliminating fault
adjudications in workers' compensation and automobile claims, and relying to considerable extent
on insurance mechanism to provide remedies).
124. Legislatures do, of course, often leave difficult issues for courts by glossing over disagree-
ments with vague language. Whatever the theoretical desirability of more precise legislative defini-
tions of substantive rights, in other words, the workings of the political process can lead to many
dispute processing problems for courts and litigants. See generally Friendly, The Gap in Lawmak-
ing--Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who Won't, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 787, 792 (1963) (criticizing
legislators for saying "enough to deprive the judges of power to make law" but not remedying
problems that result from broad statutes); Ginsburg & Huber, The Intercircuit Committee, 100
HARV. L. REv. 1417 (1987) (discussing possible responses to problem of vaguely drafted federal
statutes). Such "punting" to the judiciary also turns the courts into not just resolvers of individual
disputes but arbiters of social issues incompletely resolved in the legislature.
125. See 42 U.S.C. § 56 (1982).
126. See Leubsdorf, Recovering Attorney Fees as Damages, 38 RtrrGERs L. REv. 439, 445-46
(1986) (mentioning punitive damages, collateral source rule, pain and suffering damages, and refusal
to instruct on nontaxability of awards).
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2. Administrative Paths. The use of administrative agencies has
long been and remains a valuable means of dealing with court congestion
problems. Delegation of considerable responsibility for an area-sub-
stantive lawmaking, individual dispute processing, or both-to a special-
ized administrative body can take advantage of expertise, reduce court
caseloads, and avoid the necessity for juries (to the extent that seems
desirable). A classic example is workers' compensation legislation,
which moved most workplace injury litigation from the civil courts to
compensation boards operating under liability, compensation, and proce-
dural rules quite different from those governing tort actions. Such agen-
cies can develop their own "litigation explosion" problems, but diversion
to them of cases that for the most part require only application of settled
rules in a specialized area will often be a wise division of labor, preserv-
ing the courts for more complex cases and those that involve not just
applying general legal norms but also developing and refining them. At
its best, the use of administrative paths may provide some key advantages
of ADR, such as less formal and adversarial proceedings, without the
cost of taking disputes out from under public control, which worries
some ADR critics.
The idea that in the administrative context it might be possible to
avoid some of the worst excesses of adversary litigation is an important
theme that deserves some further attention. 127 Especially if standards
are clear and fact patterns tend to be simple and regular, such a model
may be a workable, inexpensive alternative to more complex forms of
claims processing. One recent illustration is the Veterans' Administra-
tion (now Department), whose benefit determination proceedings mostly
127. For expressions of this vision, see Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473
U.S. 305, 323-24 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.) ("Congress desired that [VA claim] proceedings be as infor-
mal and nonadversarial as possible") (footnote omitted); Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U.
PA. L. REv. 1267, 1288, 1289 (1975) (footnotes omitted):
Under our adversary system the role of counsel is not to make sure the truth is ascertained
but to advance his client's cause by any ethical means. Within the limits of professional
propriety, causing delay and sowing confusion not only are his right but may be his duty.
The appearance of counsel for the citizen is likely to lead the government to provide one-
or at least to cause the government's representative to act like one. The result may be to
turn what might have been a short conference leading to an amicable result into a pro-
tracted controversy.
These problems concerning counsel and confrontation inevitably bring up the question
whether we would not do better to abandon the adversary system in certain areas of mass
justice, notably in the many ramifications of the welfare system, in favor of one in which an
examiner ... would have the responsibility for developing all the pertinent facts and mak-
ing a just decision. Under such a model the "judge" would assume a much more active
role with respect to the course of the hearing ....
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have excluded lawyers and been subject to the most limited forms ofjudi-
cial review. 128
Yet whatever the value of administrative alternatives in general, sys-
temic reasons indicate caution on the particular idea of making adminis-
trative proceedings highly informal and nonadversarial. First, some
studies suggest that public attitudes favor adversarial over inquisitorial
approaches and find the results of adversarial proceedings easier to
accept. 129 Second, the durability of nonadversarial arrangements may
depend on the continued acceptance by the bureaucracy of a perspective
strongly oriented to client service. In the terms used by Professor Mirjan
Damaska of Yale Law School in a recent book, such structures are likely
to keep working well only if the state retains an "activist" or "manage-
rial" perspective, but not if it swings to a more "reactive" view of the role
of government:
Where government is conceived as a manager, the administration of
justice appears to be devoted to fulfillment of state programs and im-
plementation of state policies. In contrast, where government merely
maintains the social equilibrium, the administration of justice tends to
be associated with conflict resolution. 
30
Nonadjudicative forms are the natural outgrowth of an "activist"
attitude toward the role of the state; "adjudication and administration
tend to converge as a government begins to approach its fullest activist
potential."
131
But the lack of consensus in America over the scope and nature of
government's role can keep the necessary equilibrium from remaining
stable. Programs conceived and structured in a nonadjudicative mode
during an "activist" period may not work at all in the manner originally
intended when the political pendulum swings toward budget-cutting and
less active government. At that point, the agency, under new political
128. For a fuller description of the VA claims process-which includes a right to an ex parte
hearing without an official assigned to oppose the claim, before a panel that is required to assist the
claimant in developing pertinent facts, consider any evidence the claimant offers, and resolve all
reasonable doubts in the claimant's favor-see Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors,
473 U.S. 305, 309-10 (1985). Appeals are under similar rules; there is no statute of limitations; and
claims may be resubmitted with new facts and no preclusive effect from prior denial. Id. at 311.
Recent events in a major case, however, in which a trial court found extensive litigation miscon-
duct by the VA, National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543, 546-54 (N.D.
Cal. 1987), raise some question whether its own nonadversarial attitude may be eroding, which if
true could mean that lack of legal representation and judicial review would leave agency clients
insufficiently protected from administrative arbitrariness. One scandal, of course, does not by itself
undermine a whole approach. But as the text goes on to discuss, the problems in the VA case may
result from built-in difficulties that raise doubt about how far social and political conditions in mod-
em America permit reliance on informal, nonadversarial administrative conflict resolution.
129. See J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, supra note 83, at 81-93.
130. M. DAMASKA, supra note 24, at 11.
131. Id. at 89.
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direction even if its substantive mandate and administrative structures
remain unchanged, is likely to become less the ally of its clients and more
their adversary. Such a change in position can be legitimate as a matter
of public policy, but it does not fit with a structure premised on
nonadversarial attitudes and denying or sharply restricting review of
agency determinations. The pendulum swings in American politics be-
tween more and less activist government thus provide reason for care and
selectivity about building into the system reliance on highly nonadver-
sarial administrative processes.
Two other aspects of administrative paths deserve mention. First,
the administrative alternative can itself need ADR; as "agencies must
handle increasing caseloads and are accused of exhibiting problems simi-
lar to those they were established to cure," "it is only logical that [they
turn to] alternative means of dispute resolution" that are increasingly
used by the courts.132 And given the regulatory as well as adjudicative
role of agencies, ADR in this context can take novel and interesting
forms, such as the increasingly popular approach of negotiated rulemak-
ing, which seeks to exploit the satisfaction associated with participation
to reduce disputing over regulations once they are promulgated. 133
Second, the structure of the relation between courts and adjudicat-
ing agencies can be important for efficient dispute processing. Fraction-
ated court review of a more or less unified bureaucracy, as is the case
with review in the several federal courts of appeals of decisions of the
Tax Court,1 34 can reduce consistency and encourage forum shopping-
with attendant costs in maneuver and expense, difficulty in reaching set-
tlements, and inequity from disparate treatment. 135 Intensive review of
some administrative decisions also may be unnecessary and overload the
courts. The two present levels of judicial review of Social Security old
age, survivors', and disability benefit eligibility determinations 36 produce
132. Harter, Points on a Continuum: Dispute Resolution Procedures and the Administrative Pro-
cess, I ADMIN. LJ. 141, 144 (1987). For an extensive collection of materials on ADR generally and
its use in federal agencies, see ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
SOURCEBOOK: FEDERAL AGENCY USE OF ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(1987).
133. See generally Perritt, Administrative Alternative Dispute Resolution: The Development of
Negotiated Rulemaking and Other Processes, 14 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 863 (1987); Harter, Negotiat-
ing Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEo. L.J. I (1982).
134. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 7482 (West 1989).
135. For further discussion of the pros and cons of specialization at the trial and appellate levels,
see Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 65-75
(1989); Hazard & Scott, The Public Nature of Private Adjudication, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 42, 50-
52 (1988).
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 4 05 (g) (1982) (authorizing suits in federal district courts, subject to ordi-
nary review in Courts of Appeals, to challenge rulings of Secretary of Health and Human Services).
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large numbers of highly fact-dependent cases. This structure may im-
pose more of a judicial burden than is necessary in light of possible alter-
natives such as discretionary or single-level review, or perhaps even
review confined mainly to an administrative appeals tribunal with provi-
sions to ensure its independence.
137
3. The Role of Professional Responsibility. The conduct of law-
yers, in such forms as highly adversarial practices that run up costs and
delay cases, obviously can be a significant contributing factor to many of
our litigation problems. Effective canons of professional responsibility
that help restrain such excesses can play a role in reducing cost and de-
lay, to the benefit of the court system and often the clients as well. For
two reasons, however, this paper does not devote major attention to such
issues. First, other studies deal in more detail with the area; in 1986 an
ABA commission released a report taking a thorough look at the
subject,1 38 and a current ALI project is producing a Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers.
139
Second, much of the perspective of this paper focuses on the incen-
tives that affect the behavior of lawyers and other participants in dispute
processing. Such incentives can be tailored to try to encourage desirable
conduct and thus reinforce the norms of professional responsibility.
Without such incentive structures, however, lawyers as a realistic matter
are placed in positions of conflict; those who observe the canons rather
than the other incentives risk becoming the nice guys who finish last.140
137. See, eg., J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABIL-
ITY CLAIMS 189-90 (1983); R. POSNER, supra note 46, at 160-161. Justice Scalia has indicated his
support for this idea.
It is no longer necessary, as it once was, to provide for review of agency adjudication in the
federal courts simply to assure that it has been impartially conducted. We now have, as we
did not in the first half of this century, a substantial administrative judiciary which can be
relied upon to provide impartiality. It seems to me quite possible for large categories of
high-volume, relatively routine cases-Social Security disability cases, for example, and
freedom of information actions-to be disposed of with finality before an administrative
law judge, providing appeal to the courts on issues of law only if the ALJ's decision is
reversed by the agency.
Scalia, An Address by Justice Antonin Scalia, 34 FED. B. NEWS & J. 252, 254 (1987). But see Rains,
A Specialized Court for Social Security? A Critique of Recent Proposals, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1
(1987) (arguing that main problems are with Social Security administrative process itself rather than
judicial review, and that reform should focus on administrative review processes).
138. ABA Comm'n on Professionalism, ".... In the Spirit of Public Service'. A Blueprint for
the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243 (1986).
139. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1988; No. 2,
1989).
140. See, eg., Sofaer, Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery Abuse Under the New Federal Rules:
On the Limited Utility of Punishment, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 680, 703 (1983):
The will to win--so essential to effective advocacy--cannot be limited to the courtroom; it
does and to an extent should permeate the discharge of all the attorney's services to the
client. Discovery abuse will not be significantly reduced by appeals to conscience when
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The focus on incentives, then, is not to denigrate the norms of profes-
sional responsibility. Rather, it presumes that so long as our system re-
tains its strongly adversarial nature along with conflicts between ethical
rules and the other incentives facing lawyers, not too much should be
expected of the canons and from exhortations that lawyers are officers of
the court.1 41 And it suggests that we should think mainly about how to
frame the incentives to encourage the kind of conduct desired of lawyers
and others involved in dispute processing.
Yet even if one is skeptical about how much the rules of professional
responsibility can help reduce litigation cost and delay, and agrees on
stressing the incentives the system creates for desired conduct, what fol-
lows is not necessarily a bleak, narrow focus on tinkering with rewards
and refining punishments. For much of the time, behavior that the sys-
tem regards as desirable also falls within the enlightened self-interest of
lawyers and clients.1 42 Law school training and continuing professional
education can try to make lawyers more aware of the many times when it
is not just nice but also smart to refrain from the most antagonistic,
costly forms of adversarial conduct. A prominent theme in some recent
writing has been that adversarial approaches to legal negotiation often
overlook the possibilities of more cooperative efforts to identify and meet
the needs of the parties. As Roger Fisher and William Ury put it in their
exceptionally successful book, Getting to YES: "Even apart from a
shared interest in averting joint loss, there almost always exists the possi-
bility of joint gain. This may take the form of developing a mutually
advantageous relationship, or of satisfying the interests of each side with
a creative solution."1 43 But many works still stress highly adversarial
allegiance is properly divided, and when the source of improper behavior is often as elusive
as the sources of other forms of human aggressiveness and irrationality.
141. Cf 0. MARU, RESEARCH ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION: A REVIEW OF WORK DONE 56
(2d ed. 1986) ("Many lawyers at all levels do not follow some canons of the codes of professional
ethics, and in large metropolitan communities marginal practitioners frequently disregard ordinary
standards of honesty and decency as well.") (footnote omitted).
142. Such happy coincidences, of course, will not always occur. A lawyer acting in a client's
best interest could even have an ethical obligation to warn a client about and resist use of an ADR
device if it appeared likely to produce inaccurate results, inhibit settlement, or add to expense. See,
e.g., Summary Jury Trials Assailed as Inaccurate and Ineffective, 2 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 1189,
1192 (1988).
143. R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING
IN 73 (1981); see also Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of
Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 840 (1984):
[I]n a court system which is authorized primarily to award only polarized decisions and
limited remedies, the parties will be able to better craft solutions outside of the official legal
arena where greater variability can be achieved .... [B~y seeking to expand resources
before dividing them, the parties may accomplish better results for themselves individually
and increase the joint gain to both.
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approaches to legal negotiation, 144 which suggests opportunties to
change behavior through changed emphases in law school training and in
continuing legal education.
In addition, it seems quite realistic to call on lawyers' sense of pro-
fessional responsibility to initiate and support reforms aimed at reducing
cost and delay. 145 It is one thing to hope for lawyers to observe canons
(even though many will) when doing so might conflict with their gaining
advantage for a client in a particular matter. It is quite another to expect
them to put aside narrow self-interest in different contexts, such as con-
sidering changes in rules and practices that may presently raise lawyers'
fees by creating openings for costly maneuvering. Law reform in the
broader public interest, after all, is one of the founding principles of
the Institute.
V. ANALYTICAL THEMES
The problems and types of situations addressed in this paper are
many and varied, and so are the possible ways of trying to understand
and deal with them. Before moving on to more specific discussion of
"paths to a 'better way,' " this Part attempts to provide some threads for
guidance through the maze. It suggests and develops three themes,
which then are applied at various points in the following Part on possible
paths and in the final part on illustrative measures. First is the concept
from game theory of "zero-sum" and "non-zero-sum" situations-that
is, whether all that is involved is slicing a pie of fixed size, or whether and
to what extent opportunities or dangers exist to make all concerned bet-
ter or worse off. The second concept, borrowed from economic analysis,
is consideration of "external effects"-benefits or harms from an activity
whose impacts are felt by others than those directly involved in paying
for and profiting from the activity. Third is the significance and classifi-
cation of "transaction costs," which in dispute processing involve the
many factors apart from the pure merits of a dispute, such as lawyers'
fees, costs of running the judicial system, and less tangible matters like
the parties' own time and aggravation from going through a litigation.
These themes, of course, do not by any means exhaust the list of
relevant analytical tools, but they seem to be among those with the
broadest utility. Moreover, their use here is not meant to slight other
values, such as the rights and wrongs of a dispute; these themes can pro-
vide a perspective, but not the only valid one, on litigation problems.
Finally, the discussion to follow does not purport to offer a full-blown
144. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 143.
145. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 8 (1982) ("A Law-
yer Should Assist in Improving the Legal System").
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theory of anything, such as classification of disputes for ADR treatment.
It attempts, nonetheless, to advance matters by illustrating several appli-
cations of fairly well-known analytic devices.
A. "Zero-Sum" and "'Non-Zero-Sum" Situations.
A "zero-sum" situation involves pure apportionment of a fixed
amount of equivalent assets-if one side gets more, the other gets exactly
that much less. From this perspective, for example, an ordinary tort
damage case between strangers on its merits is normally a "zero-sum
game" involving a decision on how much to transfer from defendant to
plaintiff. "Non-zero-sum" situations, by contrast, involve some possibil-
ity of making both parties better (or worse) off, with each gaining from
cooperation or losing from noncooperation rather than being limited to
sheer apportionment. For example, parties that enter into a voluntary
contract are presumably in a positive non-zero-sum situation; each party
expects to benefit from the exchange. Disputes often have important
non-zero-sum potential, both positive and negative: parties who are in a
continuing relationship (such as regular business dealings or child cus-
tody between divorced parents) can find the relationship enhanced or im-
paired to a greater or lesser extent by both the way a dispute is conducted
and the terms of its resolution.
Situations are often not inherently zero-sum or non-zero-sum;
whether they work as one or the other, or contain elements of both, can
depend on how society and the legal system structure them and on how
the parties perceive their options. Legal rules are often framed in win-or-
lose, zero-sum terms, but parties to a dispute may be able to come up
with better solutions (from their joint, and arguably society's, perspec-
tive) than a court would be likely to decree. Even some apportionment
situations can be at least partly non-zero-sum, as when tangible goods of
varying natures are divided among recipients who have different interests
(the grandchildren get the toys and the adult children get the objets
d'art). Or tort case negotiators may be able to agree on a rehabilitation
program that is better for the victim and cheaper for the defendant than
payment of compensatory damages.146 Approaching situations in ways
that inject mutual benefit also can take place at levels above that of the
146. Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow of UCLA Law School argues that in fact most underly-
ing situations with which legal negotiators deal are not zero-sum, even if their training keeps them
from perceiving or acting upon the opportunities for cooperative dealing. Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 143, at 784-89. Others, like Professor Sally Engle Merry, disagree: "[M]uch of negotiation
occurs in a context in which one party's gain is possible only at the price of the other party's loss."
Merry, supra note 33, at 2064 n.28. Even when the possibility of mutual benefit exists, there is also
the question whether crafting a positive-sum solution is complex enough to make a zero-sum money
transfer look relatively more attractive to negotiators.
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individual case, such as when a labor contract or a law establishes an
accident prevention program that ends up costing less than paying for
accidents while also reducing suffering.
The concept of the zero-sum game and the potential for positive- or
negative-sum variations have many applications to dispute processing
problems, which are mentioned in particular connections at various
points in this paper. To list several of these applications briefly for pur-
poses of illustration, greater impersonality in social relations can reduce
the relationship-destroying, negative-sum potential of many lawsuits,
which may help explain rising litigiousness. 147 Second, the transaction
costs of litigation can add important negative-sum elements for the par-
ties to a dispute, as the running up of costs can make both sides worse
off-or permit a more powerful party to gain advantage by imposing un-
acceptable costs on a less well-financed adversary. Third, parties' recog-
nition of the negative-sum danger can drive them to seek ways to avoid
it, often by lower-cost ADR mechanisms or compromise settlements.
148
Fourth, a positive-sum situation for the parties and the court system,
whereby they save transaction costs by settlement or ADR, can be a
zero-sum situation when the lawyers are added to the picture. At least in
the short run, everyone else's gain can be the lawyers' loss in lower fees,
which suggests that the legal profession may have to contemplate sacri-
fices from some "better ways."
Fifth, the chance to gain by positive-sum handling of a dispute, or at
least to avoid the threat of negative-sum losses, provides perspective on
criticisms of settlement; these arguments may have greater force in situa-
tions that are dominantly zero-sum in nature, but less of an impact if the
parties can both be better off with a particular settlement. Sixth, a possi-
bility already mentioned is that of training to make lawyers and judges
more aware of chances to make all parties better off in negotiations or in
framing relief. Seventh, some types of situations may be treated regu-
larly enough as zero-sum or non-zero-sum that the distinction can help
decide whether cases should be kept in the regular courts or handled by
an ADR mechanism; it is commonly suggested, for example, that dis-
putes involving parties in continuing relationships, like many child cus-
tody and contract situations, are good candidates for ADR. Finally and
147. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
148. See, ag., W. BRAZIL, EFFECTIVE APPROACHES TO SETrLEMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR
LAWYERS AND JUDGES 11 (1988) ("Since the cost... of winning can be so great, there are a
surprising number of situations in which a settlement that confers some benefit on an opponent




most broadly, those looking at and considering changes in American dis-
pute processing systems can often profit by asking how well those sys-
tems do with the spectrum of positive- to negative-sum possibilities and
dangers: do they, for example, inject major negative-sum elements by
creating situations in which parties are tempted to try to run up adversa-
ries' costs and face no strong reasons to refrain?
B. Externalities.
The idea of "externalities," borrowed from economic analysis, refers
to the effects a transaction or dispute beyond has on those other than the
parties themselves. Pollution is a standard example of an "external dis-
economy"; when the polluter does not have to bear cleanup charges, pol-
lution can be expected to occur at a level higher than is socially optimal.
Similarly, litigation can have "external diseconomies" such as delaying
other cases and possibly inhibiting innovation, or limiting the supply of
emergency medical care. Generation of useful precedent can be an "ex-
ternal economy" of litigation, external at least to the parties who pay
much of their own costs; yet if the litigants must bear the entire cost and
not be rewarded for the external benefit, too little of such litigation will
take place.
As a practical matter, virtually all third party dispute resolution has
some externalities-such as others' knowledge that the law really does
get enforced, which in turn helps them feel that socially disruptive self-
help may be unnecessary for their own disputes. These external benefits
are important, as Alschuler argues,1 49 in assessing the question whether
courts should charge user fees generally; society should be wary lest it
discourage too much an activity that confers social benefits as well as
imposing costs. But what seems salient for most present purposes is
whether further externalities of general concern exist such as courts' de-
veloping legal doctrines, or enforcing policies that are widely felt to be
particularly important (as is stressed in "private attorney general" argu-
ments for attorney fee shifting1 50).
If a particular type of case often involves major externalities of
broad concern, that suggests that such cases should not be diverted from
the civil courts, at least not permanently. 151 The lower the incidence of
149. See Alschuler, supra note 31, at 1813-16.
150. See, eg., Rowe, supra note 96, at 662. Which policies are regarded as important, so that
cases involving their enforcement involve significant externalities, will of course vary between ob.
servers and with differing social conditions.
151. See, eg., Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARM. L.
R v. 668, 676 (1986):
[I]f ADR is extended to resolve difficult issues of constitutional or public law-making use
of nonlegal values to resolve important social issues or allowing those the law seeks to
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such externalities, the more appropriate may be ADR or routing onto a
simplified procedural track. 152 Furthermore, it may be possible for some
types of cases to use the presence or absence of significant externalities of
public concern, together with the zero-sum/non-zero-sum distinction, to
suggest what is likely to be the most appropriate form of dispute process-
ing. If the system has settled on treating a class of cases in zero-sum
terms, that is a reason to regard such cases as candidates for adjudica-
tion, although the courtroom need not always be the initial locus, de-
pending on externalities like the importance of the policies involved.
Non-zero-sum situations, by contrast, may be more suitable for either
ADR 53 or legislation, again depending on the externalities. Thus, for
cases like discrimination suits-which involve important public policies
and are often relatively zero-sum in nature-access to court can remain
especially vital.
154
Many private law disputes, like common tort litigation, are also
zero-sum situations, but because of the lesser externalities can be some-
what stronger candidates for specialized administrative resolution or
ADR mechanisms. Workers' compensation and use of mandatory court-
annexed arbitration schemes for routine tort claims provide good exam-
ples. Non-zero-sum matters with relatively few externalities of public
concern, like some family law disputes or contract claims between parties
in a continuing relationship, often hold special promise as candidates for
negotiation, consensual arbitration, or other forms of ADR. And when a
complex non-zero-sum situation contains great and far-reaching exter-
nalities, such as a case raising questions of institutional reform, an ap-
proach that is legislative in nature seems called for-whether it be by acts
regulate to delimit public rights and duties-there is real reason for concern. An oft-for-
gotten virtue of adjudication is that it ensures the proper resolution and, application of
public values. In our rush to embrace alternatives to litigation, we must be careful not to
endanger what law has accomplished or to destroy this important function of formal
adjudication.
152. See, e.g., TRENDS IN TORT, supra note 43, at 31 (noting increasing use of court-annexed
ADR mechanisms for routine personal injury torts because of high volume and stable law).
153. See, eg., Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111, 118 (1976) (discussing
"polycentric" disputes not amenable to all-or-nothing resolutions); id. at 120 (one factor suggesting
appropriateness of negotiation or mediation rather than litigation is existence of continuing relation-
ship between parties). See generally Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 353, 394-404 (1978) (discussing concept of "polycentric" problems and their unsuitability for
adjudication).
154. The rough classification suggested in the text cannot, of course, exhaust all the factors
relevant to how disputes should be treated. Professor Bumiller's argument that discrimination vic-
tims often do not pursue redress in part because many feel threatened by legal proceedings, if found
to be generally accurate, would suggest the importance of looking for less intimidating but still
effective alternatives. See supra text accompanying note 39.
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of Congress or state legislatures, administrative lawmaking, or judicial
action of a "structural" sort.155
C. Transaction Costs.
An additional perspective comes from focusing on the transaction
costs of dispute resolution. These costs are of many types, virtually
always involve "non-zero-sum" elements, and have benefits that may
sometimes be overlooked. Various writers have emphasized several of
the significant types of costs, but perhaps without bringing together
enough of them at once. Alschuler, for example, has valuably pointed
out that many analyses have dealt with what is really a three-sided trans-
action cost problem (adjudicator and both sides) as a two-sided one: pol-
icy discussion has emphasized party costs, principally attorney fees and
their apportionment, while tending to ignore system costs and the possi-
bility of user fees. 156 In addition, several others have shown how signifi-
cant principal-agent problems can arise between lawyer and client. The
economic incentives affecting lawyers do not always coincide with what
would serve their clients' interests, as for example may be true when ac-
ceptance of a low, early settlement proposal would give a lawyer retained
on a contingent percentage fee basis a good hourly return-but might not
do so well by the client as would a settlement after considerable further
effort. 157 (Aligning the interests within a side, between attorney and cli-
ent, may of course in some cases make agreement between the sides
harder to reach. This possibility illustrates the importance of the multi-
ple players affected by litigation costs and resulting incentives.)
155. A recent review by political science professor Austin Sarat of Amherst argues that classifi-
cation efforts like the rough scheme suggested in the text are a "new formalism," ignoring the extent
to which disputes and processing techniques are fluid and reciprocally shape and influence each
other. He calls for more investment of energy in encouraging those with legitimate grievances to
come forward. Sarat, The "New Formalism" in Disputing and Dispute Processing (Book Review), 21
LAW & Soc'Y REv. 695 (1988) (reviewing S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN, & F. SANDER, DIsPuTE
RESOLUTION (1985)). One can readily agree that classifications should not be too rigid, and that
mechanisms will often have to be adapted to individual cases. Yet not all classifications are formal-
isms; there is presumably no disagreement that disputes do not all require the same treatment, which
poses the problem of making the needed differentiations at wholesale or retail. Success in encourag-
ing the emergence of more disputes as Sarat desires would place more pressure on dispute processing
structures, making it all the more difficult to give each one full-dress treatment. The result would
likely be a felt need for mass treatment with fairly rough-and-ready channeling rather than case-by-
case tailoring, which leaves the question of how to do the job of classification.
156. See Alschuler, supra note 31, at 1815 n.23.
157. See generally, eg., Clermont & Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L.
REv. 529 (1978); Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General. Why the Model of the Lawyer as
Bounty HunterIs Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215 (1983); Elliott, supra note 91; Leubsdorf, The
Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473 (1981); Miller, Some Agency Problems
in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1987).
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Moreover, in a world of limited judicial resources, courts have come
to recognize their own stake in the way disputes get handled. Judges
must therefore be reckoned with as players in the game of allocating
those resources, as they face such possibilities as imposing fees for abuses
of the judicial system. Similarly, lawyers have professional and financial
interests at stake-indeed, from the viewpoint of the clients, lawyers' fees
are the major non-zero-sum element in many litigation situations. Finan-
cially, with the lawyers added to the picture, the game can revert to being
zero-sum, and the lawyers are the potential monetary losers (at least in
the short term) from many cost-saving reforms.
Analytically, litigation finance problems therefore may best be ap-
proached by taking into account as many as five principal actors who
regularly impose and bear costs-the adjudication system, plaintiff,
plaintiff's lawyer, defendant, and defendant's lawyer. Decisions have to
be made about who bears which costs, initially and finally, and how the
costs are to be reckoned. American judicial systems tend to treat the
services of public adjudicators as something close to free goods, which
affects the choice between them and private, nonsubsidized adjudicators.
(That policy also can have external effects on other users of the public
system, contributing to backlog if the system is not expanded.) The
United States, although with increasing exceptions, differs from the rest
of the industrialized democracies in leaving party costs where they fall.
And despite much discussion in recent theoretical writing, 158 there is a
tendency in practice to disregard the principal-agent problems caused by
the means of cost allocation between principal and agent.
In contrast with the merits of much ordinary litigation, transaction
costs at least as among the parties and the system have important non-
zero-sum characteristics. If the parties can settle (or litigate) a dispute
economically and reach an outcome acceptable to them, they and the
system are better off in terms of time and expense. 159 Running up litiga-
tion costs, on the other hand, will sometimes benefit only lawyers who
are paid by the hour.
Yet parties and their lawyers face strong incentives to run up costs,
with both the parties and the lawyers trapped in a "Prisoner's Dilemma"
situation in which each sees advantage in imposing costs on the other.
The frequent result is that both do just that, as in the case of discovery
158. See sources cited in note 157 supra.
159. See, eg., Cooter, Marks, & Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable
Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 228 (1982) ("In pretrial negotiations, everyone
has an interest in avoiding a trial. The surplus from cooperation is usually obvious, for example,
legal fees, cost of delaying resolution of the dispute .... "). See also Menkel-Meadow, supra note




abuse. 160 This mixture of characteristics of the underlying disputes and
the transaction costs turns what is often a zero-sum situation (the merits)
into part of a larger context in which non-zero-sum aspects are impor-
tant, even dominant, and in which the "Prisoner's Dilemma" nature of
many transaction costs provides a powerful impetus towards running up
costs of both the parties and the system. Yet recognition of this problem
implies that potential gains are there to be captured, whether by coopera-
tive negotiation, opting for less costly ADR, or reforms of the judicial
system itself to reduce or eliminate the negative-sum pressures. 161
The unattractiveness of the cost-multiplication spectacle can make it
too easy to overlook the values served in connection with at least some of
the costs. Short cuts will sometimes mean more mistakes; conventional
court procedures are in part framed with an eye to accuracy, and saving
on process costs can lead-in economists' jargon-to higher error costs.
Similarly, formal procedure may-as Delgado and his co-authors have
argued in a critique of one aspect of ADR-do at least tolerably well its
job of trying to assure impartiality and regularity. 62 Yet if the parties
lack equal ability to bear the costs associated with these benefits, that
differential can reduce or cancel the benefits and induce strategic behav-
ior to take advantage of the disparity.
160. See Note, supra note 102, at 352. The "Prisoner's Dilemma" concept from game theory
describes negative-sum situations in which cooperative behavior could benefit both parties, but ob-
stacles to cooperation lead each to behave in a way that makes both worse off as a result of their
efforts to protect themselves from the other's feared noncooperation. See 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE:
A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICs 973-76 (1987). The concept brings together the themes of negative-
sum situations and externalities, because each party has incentives to try to impose on the other a
cost created by its own behavior, which can result in the impoverishment of both. Lawyers, unfortu-
nately, are somewhat in the position of the jailers in their clients' Prisoners' Dilemma-able to
benefit, in this case financially, from what can be the mutually harmful noncooperation of the clients.
161. If the formal system creates-and then handles poorly-Prisoner's Dilemma situations, it
has to expect some litigants to seek ways to escape the formal system and gain the benefits of more
cooperative, less burdensome forms of dispute resolution. In other words, some criticism of volun-
tary resort to ADR (that it removes from the system cases that should stay in the public courts)
might better be redirected at the problems in the system that make alternatives attractive in the first
place.
Indeed, the Prisoner's Dilemma in litigation costs provides one weight in the balance in favor of
involuntary ADR. If no other good means can be found to keep litigants from running up each
other's costs, mandatory court-annexed arbitration may be one way to help them stop doing so, as
may the summary (advisory) jury trial and short "rocket docket" deadlines. See generally AMERI-
CAN BAR ASs'N, ACTION COMM'N TO REDUCE COURT COSTS AND DELAY, ATTACKING LITIGA-
TION COSTS AND DELAY 17 (1984) ("If left entirely to attorneys' choice, a simplified procedure
option will likely be underutilized.").
162. Delgado, Dunn, Brown, Lee, & Hubbert, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359 [hereinafter Delgado, Fairness
and Formality].
To the extent that potential disputants perceive the public adjudication system as having such
attractive characteristics, that perception helps account for the system's popularity, resulting
caseload problems, and the raising of many unresolved social problems in court.
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The main themes discussed in this section can interact in several
ways that bear on the "litigation problem," particularly with respect to
ADR and the shifting of costs and attorney fees. In addition to the sug-
gestion that a case can be more or less appropriate for ADR depending
on whether it is treated as "zero-sum" in nature and has major "external-
ities" of public concern, the relation between the stakes and transaction
costs is another important consideration. Many common disputes, for
example, are generally treated as zero-sum on the merits and have few
major externalities-such as ordinary tort litigation. This mix of charac-
teristics does not point strongly toward either regular court handling
or ADR, but the ratio of likely costs to the stakes involved has implica-
tions for the treatment of such cases. A high-relative-cost matter like
many ordinary small claims can be a good candidate for fee shifting, sim-
plified ADR, grouping in the form of a class action if many such claims
arise at once, or regulatory resolution if there is high repetition of an
underlying problem. If a garden variety dispute involves large stakes, by
contrast, even though it may entail few externalities it can still be a mat-
ter for ordinary litigation (albeit perhaps with user fees). Later discus-
sion will illustrate how a focus on the "externalities" and "zero-sum"
nature of a dispute can help define appropriate paths to a "better way" in
specific contexts.
VI. PREMISES AND PATHS
Previous sections considered at length many of the sources of
caseload and other litigation problems in their social setting, along with
the implications for possible reforms. Yet whatever can be said or done
about those external sources, the dispute processing system has numer-
ous problems of its own that can magnify the difficulties arising from
outside. The roots of these internal problems lie in some of the premises
of our civil dispute processing systems, and an effort to identify the prem-
ises and their contributions can aid in selecting the most promising paths
to respond to present problems. The sketch that follows is an exagger-
ated one, primarily because of the many and-as time passes-probably
increasing ways in which the premises are qualified, departed from, or
diluted. Moreover, even though some of the premises may make major
contributions to our problems, for many reasons we should be reluctant
to abandon them entirely. The following discussion of premises and how
they contribute to the "problem," then, can best be viewed not as a pro-
posal for their abandonment but rather as an effort to consider whether
and how the system should depart from them more than it already has.
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A. Premises of the Traditional System.
To a considerable extent, our present civil dispute processing system
is, at least formally, oriented toward full court trial after pretrial develop-
ment of the facts and contentions through discovery, which occurs under
a system of uniform procedural rules that govern most civil litigation. It
employs neither a loser-pays approach toward the expenses of the
litigants nor user fees for the public expenses of providing court services.
It assumes that attorneys and litigants will conduct themselves most, but
not all, of the time in accordance with the obligations and presumptions
of the rules of procedure and professional responsibility, and that after-
the-fact sanctions will suffice to deal with violations. Finally, it relies on
the market for lawyers (and on lawyers' charity) to provide legal services
in the private sector with relatively little government involvement or
support.
This picture, of course, was never fully accurate and was closer to
the truth four decades ago than it is today. In recent years, judicial in-
volvement in settlement exploration and discovery management has
grown significantly and has received explicit sanction in rule amend-
ments. 163 By creation of some specialized courts and tracks, and with
considerable judicial discretion to tailor proceedings in individual cases,
the presumption of procedural uniformity (itself a reform escaping from
the common law forms of action) has been qualified. Sanctions have
been stiffened, including broader use of attorney fee awards for proce-
dural abuse; fee shifting has grown enormously in several major areas of
the law, although court user fees have remained small. Government-
provided legal services for the poor have grown and shrunk again but
continue. Nonjudicial forms of dispute resolution, and court uses of pro-
ceedings short of full-dress trials, have proliferated.
Yet in considerable part, the premises survive and contribute to our
present problems. Uniform, primarily trial-oriented rules of procedure
remain the norm and can impose excessive formality on a simple case, or,
for that matter, deal inadequately with the intricacy or pretrial maneu-
vering in a complex one. 164 Similarly, even though laxity concerning at-
torney and party misconduct has greatly declined, enforcement comes
mostly via after-the-fact sanctions for misbehavior which are often time-
163. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7) (participants at pretrial conference may consider and act upon
the "possibility of settlement or use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute"); id. 26(b)(1)
(providing for limitation of discovery on court's initiative); id. 26(f) (giving the court power to order
a discovery conference on its own initiative).
164. While debate has mounted over whether present civil rules are too "trans-substantive," no
one is suggesting a return to the forms of action. Movement toward making more specialized tracks
available would require facing issues of how to minimize jurisdictional fights over which set of rules
should govern a case. See generally infra text accompanying notes 187-89.
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consuming and engender side battles apart from the merits. The Ameri-
can rule against recovering attorney fees from adversaries remains the
starting premise, even if it is not observed for most other costs and has
become increasingly riddled with exceptions. And publicly subsidized
legal services fared poorly in the Reagan era; while reduced government
support allows market forces to provide some useful constraint on dis-
puting, it also leaves unsolved the problems of access to justice for the
poor and of how the disparity between legal costs and recovery often
makes redress impractical in small and even medium-sized cases.
B. Lines of Inquiry.
Against this background, it may be profitable to think along some or
all of the following lines: (1) Increased focus may be long on pretrial
phases in general and on the processes of bargaining and settlement in
particular, which would include facing such key questions as how much
the system should encourage settlement and how much judges should be
involved in settlement negotiations. (2) Greater use of "tracking" or dif-
ferent types of procedures (judicial or alternative) for different kinds of
cases could be explored, bearing in mind the dangers of high transaction
costs from disputes and decisions on the appropriate track for a case. (3)
Conscious use of litigation finance, in the form of attorney fee shifting or
court user fees or both, could be used to attack present problems. (4)
Emphasis on incentives set in advance, or clear-cut rather than indefinite
and discretionary sanctions, could encourage the behavior desired of par-
ties and their representatives. (5) Finally, consideration could be given to
how, and how much, the system should temper the operation of the
market in determining how legal services get made available. These sug-
gestions do not themselves call for specific measures but rather for ap-
proaches that can lead to reforms to deal with several different problems.
To illustrate where these lines of thought could lead, the concluding part
brings together several measures suggested by these approaches.
1. Focus on Bargaining and Settlement. Despite the emphasis in
formal rules of civil procedure on pretrial and trial stages of fully con-
tested litigation, bargaining and settlement are a major part of the disput-
ing process. As James and Hazard put it,
The American court system as it exists partially accommodates au-
thoritative justice, as exemplified in the English system. Some quotient
of authoritative justice-actual adjudication according to law-is re-
quired in order to make a system of compulsory bargaining work. But
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fundamentally the American system is one of compulsory bargaining
in response to claims of right.
165
The Civil Litigation Research Project provided empirical support for this
view:
One of the most striking aspects of our study of litigation was that
bargaining and settlement are the prevalent and, for plaintiffs, perhaps
the most cost-effective activity that occurs when cases are filed. This
will come as no surprise to litigators, but it is remarkable how seldom
this fact is taken into account in discussions of the litigation crisis,
costs of litigation, and the need for "alternatives to litigation."
1 66
At the same time, considerable controversy exists about settlement
generally 167 and in particular the desirability of heavy judicial involve-
ment. 168 The importance of settlement, and the controversies over it,
suggest the need for more thinking about the ends to be sought in dealing
with settlement, the means of evaluating quality in settlement processes
and outcomes, and the many approaches the system could take toward
settlement-such as leaving it alone, encouraging it, rewarding it, or reg-
ularizing its processes.
169
Principal types of issues raised by a focus on settlement, which of
course sometimes overlap, include (1) objection to settlement as such; (2)
concern for the terms on which settlements are reached; and (3) the de-
sirability of various means by which the system can influence settlement.
Respecting the first of these, the most prominent critic of settlement is
Professor Owen Fiss of Yale Law School. He calls for "justice, not
peace," praising litigation in America for its function in making us live
up to our ideals. °70 The analytical themes developed in the preceding
section can help place this argument in context. Fiss's criticism seems to
have its greatest force in cases with significant externalities of public con-
cern, involving the enforcement of important policies or primarily legal
issues-the development and refinement of doctrine. Here, system per-
spectives and insistence on the doing of substantive justice seem to have
the greatest weight.
165. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 300 (3d ed. 1985).
166. Costs of Ordinary Litigation, supra note 14, at 122 (1983) (footnotes omitted). See also
Galanter, supra note 21, at 8 ("The rate of settlements remains high. The great majority of civil
cases are settled. The portion of cases that run the whole course of possible contest has continued a
long historical decline.").
167. See, eg., Fiss, supra note 79, at 1075 (settlement should be considered a "capitulation to the
conditions of mass society and should be neither encouraged nor praised").
168. See W. BRAZIL, SETrLING CIVIL SUITS: LITIGATORS' VIEWS ABOUT APPROPRIATE
ROLES AND EFFECTIVE TECHNIQUES FOR FEDERAL JUDGES (1985) (reporting general satisfaction
with judicial participation but also strong minority opposition).
169. For a rich yet concise survey of the literature and issues on settlement, see Galanter, The
Quality of Settlements, 1988 DISPUTE RESOL. 55.
170. See Fiss, supra note 79, at 1085-87.
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Yet litigants do not exist solely to serve the system's broader pur-
poses. The users' perspective, from which justice may often have more to
do with party preferences and satisfaction with results than with the ap-
plication of legal standards, is a valid and important one as well, and
deserves greater weight in situations different from the public law litiga-
tion Fiss emphasizes. 171 As applied to cases involving few externalities,
strong non-zero-sum aspects, and potentially high transaction costs, op-
position to negotiated settlement would often be misplaced. For exam-
ple, if separated parents and their children can agree that joint custody
would be in the interest of all, in most cases there would be little or no
reason for the system to press for an adjudicated solution.
Criticisms of settlement are perhaps most colorfully summed up in
the charge that encouraging settlement (with its effect of reducing case
backlogs) is like shooting hospital patients to free up bed space. The
analogy, however, presumes among other things that disputes need trials
the way sick patients need medical treatment. Some do, but pushing to-
ward or through trial is not always the best or only way for a dispute and
the disputants to arrive at the legal equivalent of health. Settlements
close enough to what trial would have produced can get there faster,
more cheaply, and with more certainty; an additional benefit may be less
antagonism between the parties. 172 Professor Menkel-Meadow argues in
a recent review that formal rights are far from being all that is important
to many disputants;173 to the extent that settlement preserves valued rela-
tionships without sacrificing important rights, it can be better for the par-
ties than adjudication.
Criticism or defense of settlement thus turns in part on how much it
is possible to avoid major and involuntary compromise of legal rights.
To some extent, of course, aspects of existing pretrial procedure further
that goal, as when discovery brings out information that narrows the gap
between parties' estimates of the likely outcome of trial and thus facili-
tates settlement. However, the costs of litigation, particularly those that
the rules often permit to be forced on an adversary with little or no
chance of recovery, can distort the bargaining process and lead to settle-
ments (or abandonment of claims) with little seeming basis in the
171. See Eskridge, Metaprocedure (Book Review), 98 YALE L.J. 945, 959 (1989) (reviewing R.
COVER, 0. Fiss & J. RESNIK, PROCEDURE (1988)) ("Fiss's anti-settlement thesis seems inapplicable
to most lawsuits," such as typical claims for modest sums).
172. See, e.g., Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Di-
vorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 956-57 (1979).
173. Menkel-Meadow, Familiar Arguments (Book Review), 70 JUDICATURE 307, 308 (1987)
(reviewing C. HARRINGTON, SHADOW JUSTICE: THE IDEOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
ALTERNATIVES To COURT (1985)).
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substantive merits of a dispute. Professor Richard Marcus of Hastings
has argued:
To the extent that [the] decision [to settle] is made "in the shadow of
the law" because it reflects a prediction of the substantive merits of the
case, it accomplishes the objectives of the substantive law, albeit in a
modified form because a settlement is not an "all or nothing" result
The settlement model breaks down, however, when the defend-
ant's payment to the plaintiff is based mainly on factors other than the
substantive merits of the suit.174
Given the importance of settlement, and the concern for skewing
settlements away from likely outcomes on the merits, it becomes vital to
consider the various ways the system does and can influence settlements.
Judicial participation in negotiations, and sometimes pressure to settle,
are among the hallmarks of the controversial practice of "managerial
judging," a sharp departure from the adversarial model of neutral umpir-
ing made under the felt pressures of caseload and complexity. Yet judi-
cial involvement in settlement raises difficult issues of propriety. 175
Magistrate Brazil's recent study reports quite high effectiveness of, and
lawyer satisfaction with, judicial involvement in the settlement
process. 176 He also notes, however, intense opposition on the part of a
small minority to judges having anything at all to do with settlements.
Brazil's survey of lawyers' reactions underscores that it may be unwise
for a judge who participated considerably in settlement negotiations to
try the case if no settlement is reached, particularly when trial is to the
court rather than by jury. 177
174. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86
COLUM. L. Rav. 433, 456 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
175. See generally Provine, Managing Negotiated Justice: Settlement Procedures in the Courts,
12 JusT. Sys. J. 91, 107 (1987) (empirical research on judicial intervention in settlement may have
omitted question of how to evaluate judicial role, and ignored concern for public confidence in judi-
cial fairness).
176. W. BRAZIL, supra note 168.
177. See id at 5; accord Provine, supra note 175, at 108. That concern, in turn, suggests such
possibilities as having a magistrate or judge who will not try the case participate in the settlement
discussions--or ways of promoting settlement that do not involve judges and jeopardize their impar-
tiality, such as offer of settlement rules and "quick look" ADR devices.
More generally, much of course depends on how the court goes about trying to promote settle-
ment. Professor Galanter suggests a useful broad distinction when he refers to
the two recurrent themes that impel and justify judicial involvement in the settlement pro-
cess. We might call these the "warm" theme and the "cool" theme. The "warm" theme
refers to the impulse to replace adversary conflict by a process of conciliation to bring the
parties into a mutual accord that expresses and produces community among them. The
"cool" theme emphasizes not a more admirable process but efficient institutional manage-
ment: clearing dockets, reducing delay, eliminating expense, unburdening the courts.
Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Cases, 69 JUDICATURE 257, 257 (1986).
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"Managerial" judges' promotion of settlements is understandable as
a response to present problems, but given its difficulties it may prove to
be a transitional second best if other effective mechanisms can be
evolved. Professor Donald Elliott of Yale Law School argues:
Redesigning incentives with an eye to their effect on the terms of settle-
ments will not only reduce the arbitrariness which is inherent in mana-
gerial judging, but will also be more likely than ad hoc intervention by
judges to encourage just outcomes. For example, if the existing meth-
ods of compensating counsel do in fact create powerful economic in-
centives for lawyers to act in ways that are not in the best interests of
their clients, restructuring the compensation system directly is more
likely to be effective than managerial techniques. Similarly, if defend-
ants are encouraged to delay judgment because of rules of law that
deny successful litigants the full time-value of money during the pen-
dency of litigation, restructuring the system of incentives is more likely
to be successful than is an overlay of counterincentives imposed on an
ad hoc basis by managerial judges.
Reforming procedural incentives to promote just settlements re-
quires a fundamental change in the way that we view civil procedure.
Before such changes can be made, we will have to stop thinking of the
"pretrial" process as a prelude to trial, and start thinking of it as the
"main event"-as the matrix of incentives within which the over-
whelming majority of cases are going to be settled by two party-ap-
pointed arbitrators (the opposing lawyers). The most pervasive
"ADR' system in the United States today is probably pretrial proce-
dure under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but this system has
been designed with little or no attention to its effect on the terms of
settlement. 178
This is not the place to think through all the possible alternatives to
"managerial judging" in connection with settlements, but one theme that
can suggest several approaches bears emphasis: the reduction of uncer-
tainty about likely outcomes, and its importance to reducing costs and
facilitating settlements. James and Hazard argue that
the critical factor [in the cost of litigation] is the degree of uncertainty
as to how the judicial system will assess a case once it proceeds beyond
an initial statement of claim. Most discussions of procedural reform
for reducing litigation cost ignore the uncertainty factor, apparently
presupposing that uncertainty of outcome has to be taken as a given.
In fact, however, there are changes in procedure and court organiza-
tion that could significantly reduce uncertainty. 179
178. Elliott, supra note 91, at 335-36.
179. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 165, at 293. See also Kritzer, A Comparative Perspec-
tive on Settlement and Bargaining in Personal Injury Cases (Book Review), 14 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY
167, 183-85 (1989) (reviewing H. GENN, HARD BARGAINING: OUT OF COURT SETTLEMENT IN
PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS (1988)) (discussing relative impact of greater uncertainty over liability
in England and over damages in America, with uncertainty from lack of discovery combining with
threat of fee liability placing one-shot litigant at extreme disadvantage in England).
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To be sure, one essential way of reducing uncertainty for some cases
is litigating others to judgment.18 0 Moreover, "sharpening the shadow"
of the law in which the parties bargain may not be of great value in
settling cases that are non-zero-sum on the merits.18 1 Still, reducing un-
certainty by judges' expressing "analytical opinion" was what Brazil's
subjects welcomed most from judicial participation in settlement deliber-
ations.18 2 Numerous devices and suggestions-such as "quick looks"
through one or another form of ADR, offer of settlement rules, and dam-
ages guidelines-all share that common goal.
2. "Tracking"--and Alternative Dispute Resolution. One of the
major reforms of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was to carry for-
ward the process of unifying civil rules that had begun with the abandon-
ment of the forms of action. This change is reflected in Rule 2 with its
specification that there shall be "one form of action to be known as 'civil
action.'" The artificial, historical divisions between law and equity and
among forms of action had indeed become dysfunctional, and unification
does serve to eliminate some jurisdictional disputes. But if the old divi-
sions, primarily along lines of subject matter or type of relief, had become
outmoded, unification has its problems as well. Professor Maurice Ro-
senberg has argued that
the federal district courts and busy trial-level courts in the state sys-
tems need to diversify their procedures to satisfy the varied needs of
the cases. Furthermore, they must be ready to make trade-offs. Some-
times they must give up the ideal procedures for processes that will
better achieve simpler and less costly dispositions.
Recent experience suggests that many of the emerging procedural
needs of a judicial system can best be met by creating different tracks
for different types of cases and then routing the cases through the most
suitable processing channels. This permits simple, streamlined proce-
dures in cases that cannot use the more elaborate procedures the rules
contemplate. Particularly, it allows cutting down on pretrial
discovery. 1
8 3
"Tracking" can be viewed in part as a response to the point made by
many studies that general civil litigation today is roughly divisible be-
tween numerous modest claims and a smaller number of large, frequently
180. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 161, 165 (1986).
181. Cf Menkel-Meadow, supra note 143, at 789 ("The assumption that only limited items are
available in dispute resolution occurs because negotiation takes place in the shadow of the courts.
Negotiators too often conclude that they are limited to what would be available if the court entered a
judgment.").
182. See W. BRAZIL, supra note 168, at 2.
183. Rosenberg, The Federal Civil Rules After Halfa Century, 36 ME. L. REv. 243, 244 (1984).
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complex cases. 184 It can take several forms and already is found to some
extent in most jurisdictions, with special rules for such types of cases as
small claims and probate matters. The state of the art is advancing, with
such innovations as the apparently successful Differentiated Case Man-
agement Project in Bergen County, New Jersey, with three basic tracks
(expedited, standard and complex) and regularized, active management
as a case progresses.185 Current suggestions often focus on claims of
moderate scale, on various types of alternative dispute resolution, and on
some particularly complex matters, which this project leaves to the Insti-
tute's Study of Complex Litigation.
The issues here are numerous and difficult enough that a brief treat-
ment can do little more than attempt to identify and classify them. A
threshold question, which takes various forms, is whether to attempt
much categorization at all; Professor Austin Sarat's recent book review,
discussed above, criticizes some current efforts to channel disputes ac-
cording to their type as a "new formalism."' 18 6 Other scholars, question-
ing the failure of federal-style rules to differentiate by case type, ask
whether the civil justice system can maintain the "trans-substantive" na-
ture of present procedural rules, with one set of rules meant to provide
the basic framework for most types of civil litigation.187 The area
184. See, eg., NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 1984, supra note 56,
at 173; Friedman, supra note 46, at 32; cf TRENDS IN TORT, supra note 43, at 2-3 (arguing that data
suggest three-part division of tort litigation into routine personal injury torts, high-stakes personal
injury suits, and mass latent injury cases).
185. See DIFFERENTIATED CASE MANAGEMENT PROJECT: ASSESSMENT OF THE BERGEN EX-
PERIENCE (1988); Bakke & Solomon, Case Differentiation: An Approach to Individualized Case
Management, 73 JUDICATURE 17 (1989). A recent study by a task force of the Brookings Institution
and the Foundation for Change recommends such tracking systems as a major element of plans to
reduce costs and delay in federal civil litigation. See Litan, Speeding Up Civil Justice, 73 JUDICA-
TURE 162, 164 (1989).
186. See Sarat, supra note 155.
187. See, eg., Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494,
512, 547-48 (1986) (arguing that "the trans-substantive promise of the Rules has proved unwork-
able" and that "we need to determine what subsets of cases require special kinds of rules, and write
rules for those kinds of cases"); Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909, 985 (1987) (footnotes omitted):
Providing more guidance for lawyers and their clients [on pleading and signature require-
ments] would necessitate inroads on trans-substantive procedure. Some types of cases may
permit lawyers to know more about the facts at the initial pleading stage than others.
Perhaps there should be different procedural rules for different types of cases. But ... one
cannot discuss what procedure should go with what substantive areas without acknowledg-
ing that the choices will deeply affect the substantive law and influence which cases are
brought and won. This suggests a more active role for legislators in procedural rulemak-
ing.
The major work that remains to be done, if the idea of "trans-substantive" rules is to be modi-
fied, is to identify the relevant grounds for distinction-whether they be subject matter, complexity
of case, type of procedural problems involved, or others-and to suggest what different rules should
apply to each distinct type. For a detailed argument against non-trans-substantive rules, using as an
example the proposed revisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dealing with unfounded
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abounds in tradeoffs: trans-substantive rules can lead to the danger of
Procrustean uniformity, while categorical tracking can yield possibly
higher transaction costs due to lawyers having to master more sets of
rules and jurisdictional battles over which track a case should be on. 188
With fairly detailed individual-case tailoring, as opposed to categorical
tracking, there is a likelihood that it would be cost-effective only in cases
involving fairly large stakes. Thus far, the most promising "tracking"
approaches appear to classify by scale and complexity rather than by
substance,18 9 which may respond to many of the perceived problems
while having the incidental virtue of provoking less political controversy
with its often accompanying delay and advantage for organized interest
groups.
To the extent that more refined categorical treatment seems desira-
ble and feasible, the most frequently mentioned indicators for classifica-
tion, beyond the amount claimed and the likely ratio of costs to stakes,
include the absence of issues involving major public policy; the equality
of the power relationship between the parties, which may suit a dispute
better for negotiation or ADR than if the parties have quite different
bargaining strengths; the presence of a continuing relationship between
the parties; and the apparent need of a dispute for application of settled
law versus crafting of creative solutions.190
3. Litigation Finance-Attorney Fee Shifting and Court User Fees.
In both actual use and law review commentary, attorney fee awards have
been a growth industry for the last several years. Court filing fees, by
assertions, see Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exor-
cism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067 (1989).
For a summary of opposing views, see Subrin, Fireworks on the 50th Anniversary of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 73 JUDICATURE 4, 8-9, 47 (1989).
188. See, eg., Carrington, Civil Procedure and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 34 J. LEGAL
EDuc. 298, 302 (1984) ("much talk and effort is inverted in designing varied procedures for different
classes of disputes); Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Cvi Proce-
dure in Historical Perspective, supra note 187, at 985 (noting that devising new rules for different
types of cases "means confronting the demons of technicality, line-drawing, and definition"), Profes-
sor Subrin sees offsetting benefits from more precisely tailored procedural rules, viewing them as a
conceivable way of avoiding ADR, managerial judging, and settlement pressures:
My point is not that alternative dispute resolution is bad. Rather, it does not help solve,
and indeed resembles, an equity-based procedure that fails to concentrate on how law can
be applied in a reasonably consistent and predictable manner.
The momentum toward case management, settlement, and alternative dispute resolu-
tion represents, for the most part, a continued failure to use predefined procedures in a
manner that will try, however imperfectly, to deliver predefined law and rights.
Id. at 991, 1001-02.
189.. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
190. See S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN, & F. SANDER, DIsPUTE RESOLUTION 10-11 (1985); Ed-
wards, supra note 151, at 676.
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contrast, have not been widely used and remain quite modest, continuing
to bear little relation to actual court costs. Thinking about economic
incentives and market approaches, however, appropriately puts court
user fees on the agenda as well. Since background of the American rule
has been discussed above, 19 1 this section will focus on court user fees and
the purposes of litigation finance measures. Consideration of specific
possible changes in fee shifting and user fees appears in the concluding
part.
In contrast to the cottage industry surrounding fee awards, our usu-
ally nominal court user fees have been the subject of few developments
and relatively little commentary-until just the last few years, when writ-
ings by Judge Posner,192 former Solicitor General Rex Lee,193 and Pro-
fessor Alschuler194 have discussed them in some detail and from varying
perspectives. To the extent that courts in this country do charge user
fees, they are normally borne in the end by the loser as "costs," thus
being a sharp (if most often minor) departure from the dominant Ameri-
can practice on attorney fees. A modern judicial system can feasibly op-
erate with quite substantial user fees; the general policy for civil courts in
England is that the government pays the judges and the litigants pay for
everything else. ' 5
More generally, litigation finance measures can take many forms
and can be aimed at serving several different goals by deliberate use of
the allocation and reckoning of transaction costs. An important overall
theme is to allocate costs so as to internalize for the parties the external
economies and diseconomies of a suit, in order to achieve an optimal
level of litigation.196 Attorney fee awards, for example, can be allowed
(1) in an effort to encourage suits of certain kinds (such as those to en-
force important policies), thus basing the justification on the nature of
the underlying claim; or (2) because costs disproportionate to the
amounts at stake otherwise make pursuing small claims uneconomical,
thus focusing on the relationship between transaction costs and the claim
191. See supra text accompanying notes 92-101.
192. See R. POSNER, supra note 46, at 131-36.
193. Lee, The American Courts as Public Goods: Who Should Pay the Costs of Litigation?, 34
CATH. U.L. REV. 267 (1985).
194. Alschuler, supra note 31.
195. J. SPENCER, JACKSON'S THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE 445-47 (8th ed. 1989). Relatively
generous civil legal aid in England means, however, that the source of much revenue from court fees
is the budget of another government agency. See id. at 447.
196. See, eg., T. CAMPBELL, FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 68: A COMMENT 19
(Stanford Law School Law and Economics Program Working Paper No. 31, 1987) ("As long as
plaintiffs or defendants escape having to pay the full cost of going to trial (most importantly, by not
paying the other side's attorneys' fees) it can be expected that they will each indulge in more than the
optimal amount of litigation.").
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itself; or (3) to deter, punish, and compensate for litigation misconduct
such as discovery abuse, thus using transaction costs to deal with a prob-
lem that itself largely has to do with misuse of transaction costs; or (4) in
the case of offer of settlement rules, in hopes of inducing realistic bar-
gaining on the merits. Because discussion of such devices gets quickly
into specific proposals, further treatment of both attorney fee awards and
court user fees is saved for the final part on illustrative measures.
4. Advance Incentives versus Requirements-cum-Sanctions. There
are perhaps two main (and often overlapping) ways to encourage desired
behavior. One is to tell people that they must do something and then, if
they do not, to impose sanctions. These either can be fairly clear and
automatic or more indefinite and discretionary. The second way is to tell
people in advance that if they do something, they can qualify for some
benefit they want, or that their rewards will be reckoned in a certain way
(which those setting the rewards expect normally to result in desired be-
havior). Under the second general approach, those who find the benefits
not attractive enough, or fail to take the desired steps, simply do not get
the benefits, or find their rewards calculated in ways that turn out to be
disadvantageous given how they conducted themselves. The second
route can have the advantage of making after-the-fact sanctioning pro-
ceedings unnecessary.
As Professor Maurice Rosenberg wrote in the same article in which
he advocated "tracking":
Rather than devise additional rules propelled by threats of sanctions
and penalties, a modem procedural system should try to develop in-
centives and rewards of positive kinds to encourage lawyers to act in
harmony with the system's goals. Essentially, it should look for ways
to reward compliance rather than punish non-compliance. The incen-
tive approach is not only more pleasant, it is more efficient, for it does
not require enforcement activities, satellite litigation, or other extra
steps. 197
Although the general point is far from a novel one, it may not have
been prominent enough in thinking about litigation reforms. Some pro-
cedural rules do use sanctions clearly defined in advance that normally
do not require much judicial effort to determine and implement: no one
compels litigants to present a personal jurisdiction dismissal motion
197. Rosenberg, supra note 183, at 248; see also Elliott, supra note 91, at 322 (footnote omitted):
We would almost certainly do better by structuring a procedural system in which the in-
centives presented to private litigants and their attorneys rewarded the kind of behavior
that we as a society wish to encourage, rather than depending on judges to detect undesir-
able behavior and repress it after the fact.
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when they make another motion relying on Rule 12(b) grounds, or or-
ders them to fie a compulsory counterclaim; the rules make it clear be-
forehand that waiver is a consequence of failure to make a timely motion
or filing. Still, many rules either do not take advantage of advance incen-
tive possibilities (for example, denial of prejudgment interest), or rely
heavily on post-misconduct individualized sanctioning proceedings (for
example, discovery).
5. The Provision of Legal Services and Access to Justice. Efforts to
deal with cost, volume, and delay in conventional litigation face a di-
lemma, or at least a danger: the remedies used to attack these problems
could come at too great a cost to other goals, as by reducing the availabil-
ity of legal services and providing inferior or ineffective redress for the
violation of legal rights. Caps on attorney fee awards, even if defensible
on various grounds, discourage attorneys from taking affected cases in
the first place. ADR is sometimes criticized for providing "second class
justice" to society's have-nots (and defended as more accessible and even
better than assembly-line justice in overcrowded courts). Substantial
user fees applicable to a broad range of cases, or general loser-pays fee
shifting, as a practical matter might too often close courthouse doors. At
the least, then, reform efforts must pay close attention to the side effects
that the paths being explored would have on access to justice.
The dilemma, however, may be less intractable than it at first
appears, for responses to litigation problems can serve multiple ends.
Careful crafting of litigation finance rules, for example, can enhance de-
sirable access by encouraging strong claims and equalizing party
strengths while acting as an appropriate filter against very weak
claims.198 The present fee shifting regime for federal civil rights cases
attempts to accomplish these goals with its basically one-way pro-pre-
vailing-plaintiff approach, sensibly tempered with the Christiansburg
rule199 allowing shifting in favor of defendants when plaintiffs brought or
pursued baseless claims, and the Marek rule,200 permitting defendants to
reduce their fee exposure with an offer of judgment.
198. See, e.g., Leubsdorf, supra note 126, at 449 ("If properly shaped, . . . a rule [allowing
recovery of attorney fees as damages] would not encourage plaintiffs' lawyers to spend needless
hours on cases, or discourage defendants from raising valid defenses, or reduce settlements. Indeed,
the rule might be formed so as to make defendants more willing than they are now to raise valid
defenses and to maintain incentives to settle."); Rowe, supra note 92, at 148-54 (discussing effects of
different fee rules on pursuit of strong small claims, on "nuisance" suits, and on claims and defenses
of litigants of modest means); Note, Fee Simple: A Proposal to Adopt a Two-Way Fee Shift for Low-
Income Litigants, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1231, 1241 (1988) (advocating loser-pays fee shifting but with
attorneys rather than clients liable for shifted fees).
199. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978).




The foregoing discussion of problems and approaches attempts to
frame general issues without going too deeply into highly specific propos-
als. To add concreteness, and because more than one of the themes and
approaches discussed above often bear on a single possible response, this
section picks out several main potential reforms for purposes of illustra-
tion. Two seem to warrant mention but little additional comment-
changes in administrative review, discussed above,20 1 and prejudgment
interest on damage claims. The latter is fairly simple and straightfor-
ward; it follows both from ideas of full compensation and from focus on
ex ante incentives, since it makes delay less attractive for defendants.
20 2
Many states now provide for prejudgment interest,20 3 most often not
from the time of the wrong but rather from the date of filing;204 that
approach makes some sense to encourage people to file early rather than
wait until near the running of the statute of limitations, although it can
deny full compensation and encourage "sue first, ask later" premature
filings.20 5 In any event, either variation seems preferable to the tradi-
tional rule of no prejudgment interest.20 6
The major possible paths considered here are: (1) broadened attor-
ney fee shifting to encourage meritorious claims, discourage groundless
ones (thus stopping short of the English rule), and deter and punish abu-
sive tactics; (2) means of reckoning attorney fee awards that require less
after-the-fact contention, and provide better advance incentives, than the
present method of rate-times-hours "lodestar" approach and case-by-
201. See supra text accompanying notes 127-37.
202. It might also reduce somewhat the urgency that plaintiffs feel about getting paid, although
they may need the money quickly without regard to whether they can expect interest on it. At any
rate, delay that is unobjectionable to both parties would be preferable to delay caused by one party's
taking advantage of a one-sided, undercompensatory rule to the detriment of the adversary.
203. Comment, The Availability of Prejudgment Interest in Personal Injury and Wrongful Death
Cases, 16 U.S.F. L. REv. 325, 340-41 n.ll0 (1982).
204. See Comment, Prejudgment Interest: Survey and Suggestion, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 192, 218-
19 (1982).
205. Id. at 219.
206. In support of the award of prejudgment interest, see Gorenstein Enters. v. Quality Care-
USA, 874 F.2d 431, 436 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.) (adopting federal common law presumption in
favor of prejudgment interest for victims of federal law violations); Alsehuler, supra note 31, at 1823.
For a preliminary empirical study suggesting that juries already may inflate verdicts so that they
effectively award prejudgment interest at more than the market rate, see S. CARROLL, JURY
AWARDS AND PREJUDGMENT INTEREsr IN TORT CASES (1983). For illustration of persisting in-
consistency in the law on awards of prejudgment interest, compare Loeffler v. Frank, 108 S. Ct.
1965, 1970 (1988) (prejudgment interest available in suit against United States Postal Service under
federal civil rights laws because of "sue and be sued" clause in statute governing USPS) with Mon-
essen S.W. Ry. v. Morgan, 108 S. Ct. 1837, 1844 (1988) (state courts may not award prejudgment
interest in suit under Federal Employers' Liability Act because Congress has failed to amend law
enacted when denial of such awards was general rule).
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case determination of a contingency multiplier; (3) provision for formal
offers of settlement affecting liability for post-offer attorney fees, with ad-
aptations to existing fee shifting rules and possibly some protections
against severe effects; (4) substantial cost-based court user fees; and (5)
depending both on arguments over values and goals and on the results of
current experience and studies, expanded use of alternative dispute reso-
lution mechanisms, primarily to provide early evaluations so as to facili-
tate voluntary settlements, as a lower-cost track for cases of moderate
scale, and for non-zero-sum disputes.
A. More Attorney Fee Shifting?
The varieties of conceivable attorney fee shifting schemes are many,
and any major change would have to be carefully designed to accomplish
its purposes and not cause too many side effects in the form of unjust
results and high transaction costs. (It is always possible to give a good
idea a bad name by carrying it out badly.) Specific possibilities include:
(1) two-way, loser-pays fee shifting on the English and Continental
model; (2) primarily one-way, pro-prevailing-plaintiff shifting, at least in
selected areas in which it is desirable to provide strong incentives for the
pursuit of claims, as has already been done with federal civil rights
claims and with small claims in several states; (3) fee shifting against
parties (perhaps with liability at least shared by attorneys) who are found
to have filed unreasonable claims or defenses, or to have maintained them
after it became apparent they were baseless; and (4) expansion of fee shift-
ing against unsuccessful discovery motions and resistance, and against
procedural abuses generally. In addition, sections below on fee award
calculation and offers of settlement bear on the points being discussed
here.
1. The English Rule for America? Those responding to Ameri-
can litigation problems often look for solutions to England's loser-pays
rule on attorney fees.207 Indeed, fee shifting proposals may be something
of a barometer of attitudes in American legal culture. No one should be
too surprised that in a society with fairly strong emphasis on easy access
to the courts, the virtually unique American rule, particularly its aspect
that denies recovery to prevailing defendants, has retained fairly strong
roots. The 1960s and 1970s, when the emphasis on access to justice be-
came even stronger, saw the enactment of many of the most prominent
one-way pro-prevailing-plaintiff fee shifting statutes. And recent calls for
207. See,.- eg., Figa, The "American Rule" Has Outlived Its Usefulness; Adopt the "English
Rule," NAT'L LJ., Oct. 20, 1986, at 13.
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a closer look at the English rule208 seem to correlate with a sense of
Tocquevillian surfeit, that in keeping access to justice easy we have made
too much of a good thing.
Loser-pays fee shifting does have desirable effects-for example,
fuller compensation of winners and deterrence of nuisance claims. The
English approach, though, has negative effects as well, and it may be
possible to get the benefits without at least some of the problems. In
brief, the English rule works harshly in close cases, especially when a
plaintiff was entirely reasonable in pursuing a claim that turned out at
trial to lose.209 As a result, the rule may excessively discourage the press-
ing of plausible but not clearly winning claims, particularly when the
prospective plaintiffs are strongly risk averse. This effect is especially
likely to fall heavily on middle class people with something to lose but
not so many assets that they can tolerably afford to lose much. 210 Fur-
thermore, for cases in which the parties remain in disagreement on their
assessment of the likely outcome of trial, the English rule can actually
make settlement less likely--other things being equal, it increases the gap
between the litigants.2
2. One-Way Pro-Prevailing-Plaintiff Fee Shifting. For various
reasons, some kinds of claims may not get brought as much is socially
optimal unless they receive extra encouragement. Furthermore, in some
kinds of litigation, there often exists a regular disparity in power between
the sides, as can be the case with employees suing their employers for
wage and hour or civil rights violations, or with private individuals suing
the government. In such situations, a rule that a prevailing plaintiff, but
not a prevailing defendant, is normally entitled to a fee award can en-
courage the pursuit of claims and help equalize the litigating strengths of
the parties.2 12 Such considerations seem to underlie much existing fee
208. See, eg., Figa, supra note 207; Schraub, Don't Tinker with It, Reform It, Wash. Lawyer,
July-Aug. 1989, at 22-24.
209. See, eg., Rowe, supra note 96, at 656-57.
210. See, eg., Rowe, supra note 92, at 153-54.
211. See id. at 157. One-way rules can have that same effect, but to a lesser extent. Id. For an
excellent economic analysis of the likely effects of different fee shifting rules, see Shavell, Suit, Settle-
ment, and Trial, A TheoreticalAnalysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs,
11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982).
212. See, eg., Rowe, supra note 96, at 663-64 ("'When one side in a particular type of litigation
regularly has the advantage of superior resources, holding out the prospect of reimbursement of fees
can improve the position and stiffen the resolve of the relatively weaker side.") (footnote omitted).
Special circumstances could also call for one-way pro-prevailing-defendant fee shifting. See, e.g.,
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, 6101-02 (Smith-Hurd 1981) (suits by credit card issuers against credit
card holders).
Empirical research seems needed on the basic question of how much attorney fee award provi-
sions actually encourage pursuit of claims. Professors Stewart Schwab and Theodore Eisenberg of
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shifting, demonstrated in federal minimum wage213 and civil rights
cases214 and under the federal Equal Access to Justice Act.215
One area in which pro-plaintiff fee shifting is under-used-although
the suggestion is likely at first to seem out of place-may be small claims.
Even strong small claims often are not worth pursuing because plaintiffs'
attorney fees could take too much of, or even exceed, any recovery. En-
couraging small claims by fee shifting raises the specter of an already
burdened system facing a flood of added small claims. Yet several states
do have fee shifting laws for small damage cases, 216 and on further reflec-
tion the idea of encouraging the pursuit of strong small claims by fee
awards may not be so frightening after all. They are often not pursued
now because they are not worth pressing; but if plaintiffs did pursue
them, it is likely that such claims usually would be settled quickly (often,
even before court filing) because they would not be worth defending.
217
To put it another way, most small claims will not be litigated fully
because they are not worth litigating; that can come about in either of
two ways-their not being pursued at all, or their not being defended
against. Between the two alternatives, the second seems clearly prefer-
able. Yet now, a plaintiff's threat to pursue even a strong small claim is
often hollow because of the expense, which can permit prospective de-
fendants to refuse to negotiate. Making the threat more real could lead
to more effective enforcement of rights without, perhaps, many more
court filings because the threat could yield pre-filing settlements and even
altered primary behavior.21 8 Finally, smaller claims-if they do get pur-
sued-are strong candidates for simplified alternative dispute resolu-
tion,21 9 as discussed below.
Cornell Law School report after a study of constitutional tort litigation in three federal districts that
"attorney fee statutes may have less of an effect on filing rates than is commonly believed." Before
reaching a firm conclusion, however, "one should study the effect of other fee statutes on filing
rates." Schwab & Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of the Attor-
ney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 719, 780 (1988).
A broader argument for primarily one-way pro-prevailing-plaintiff fee shifting, which goes be-
yond the scope of this study, is that the American rule denies full compensation to successful dam-
age claimants even though our law of remedies purports to award it. See, eg., Leubsdorf, supra note
126; Rowe, supra note 96, at 657-59.
213. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982).
214. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
215. 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1988); 28 id. § 2412 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
216. See Rowe, supra note 92, at 149 n.42. See also City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561
(1986) (divided Supreme Court refused to adopt a general "proportionality" requirement for awards
under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)).
217. See Rowe, The Supreme Court on Attorney Fee Awards, 1985 and 1986 Terms: Economics,
Ethics, and Ex Ante Analysis, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL Emnics 621, 623-27 (1988).
218. Cf R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 538 (3d ed. 1986) (likely deterrence of
underlying wrongs from making pursuit of small claims feasible).
219. See, e.g., CORC REPORT, supra note 23, at 112.
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3. Fee Shifting Against Groundless or Unreasonable Claims and
Defenses. In the Christiansburg case,220 the Supreme Court interpreted
the federal fee shifting statutes to modify the traditional "bad faith" rule,
which requires a finding of subjective bad faith for a fee award against a
losing plaintiff. For cases in which prevailing plaintiffs are normally enti-
tled to a fee award, the Court held that prevailing defendants could qual-
ify for a fee award if the plaintiff's claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or
groundless, or was pursued after it clearly became so in the course of the
litigation (as by discovery), even if no subjective bad faith was found.
221
It may initially seem odd, since Congress has decided that it wants
to use fee awards to encourage plaintiffs, for the Court to interpret the
statutes so as to make it somewhat easier than usual for defendants to
recover them as well. Doing so, however, makes excellent sense, for pro-
plaintiff shifting gives at least some encouragement to bad claims as well
as good ones. To gain a filtering effect-to counter the undesirable
encouragement of bad claims-some offsetting incentive is needed.222 It
is also important, as the Court recognized in Christiansburg, to apply the
rule not only to cases of frivolousfilings; a claim that was plausible when
brought can turn out to be not merely a loser at trial but clearly baseless
before trial. A measure that gives a defendant the leverage of a possible
fee shift may enable the defendant to get the plaintiff to abandon the
claim without a negotiated nuisance payment.
To deter and compensate for nuisance litigation, it is worth consid-
ering whether and how far the Christiansburg rule should be generalized
beyond the contexts in which it now applies, including possible applica-
bility to baseless defenses when a prevailing plaintiff is not otherwise enti-
tled to a fee shift. It seems quite justified and should provide desirable
incentives to relax the present bad faith rule; the result would be to make
fee shifts somewhat easier when a party not only lost, but should also
have known never to raise the claim or defense, or clearly should have
abandoned it.
A possible complement to broadening the applicability of the Chris-
tiansburg rule is attorney liability for fees shifted under the rule. Many
awards under Christiansburg have been nominal or sharply reduced be-
cause of plaintiffs' lack of means.223 The awards thus fail to compensate
220. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
221. Ia at 421-22.
222. See generally Edwards, supra note 47, at 902 (need for mechanisms to deal with frivolous
claims); Wade, supra note 82.
223. 2 M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, COURT AWARDED ATrORNEY FEES 116,05[2] (1989).
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defendants for much legitimate legal expense. These decisions are under-
standable, given that the plaintiffs could not begin to pay all of defend-
ants' reasonable fees. Yet this gap between fees incurred and those
compensated for partly defeats a purpose of the rule: it reintroduces the
possibility that plaintiffs can bargain for nuisance settlements on the basis
of fees that defendants can expect not to recover. Attorney liability in
such situations could intensify conflict of interest problems and would be
a fairly radical step, although it has been taken recently in related and
sometimes overlapping areas such as Rule 11.224 And if the standard is
one of frivolousness or unreasonableness, administered so as not to penal-
ize those who pursue plausible cases that lose, the attorneys seem to de-
serve little sympathy.
4. Fee Shifting for Procedural Abuse and on Discovery Motions.
Much has been done in the last several years to increase the use of sanc-
tions in general, and attorney fee awards in particular, in connection with
various forms of procedural abuse. Most prominent are the parallel
amendments to Federal Rules 11, 16, and 26, with their certification re-
quirements and enhanced sanction powers. Such measures respond to
the "prisoner's dilemma" situation in discovery225 and, if successfully
used, reduce one side's ability to weaken the other's settlement position
(based on the merits) by forcing the adversary to incur substantial un-
reimbursable litigation costs. The main reasons for the amendments
were not merely abusive pleading and motion practices and excessive dis-
covery in some cases, but also the limited use courts had been making of
their sanctioning powers.
226
Rule 11, in particular, has been very heavily litigated since its
amendment in 1983 and is commensurately controversial. 227 Two re-
cent, significant studies shed light on Rule 11 and find what may be sur-
prisingly broad support for it. While recognizing problems with the
Rule, they also conclude that it is serving several desirable purposes. The
combination of at least some success with still limited empirical knowl-
edge about the Rule's effects suggests the need for further work before
224. See also Note, supra note 198 (proposing two-way fee shifting with attorney liability for
cases of low-income litigants).
225. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
226. See, eg., R. RODE, K. RIPPLE, & C. MOONEY, SANCTIONS IMPOSABLE FOR VIOLATIONS
OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1981).
227. Compare, eg., Levin & Sobel, Achieving Balance in the Developing Law of Sanctions, 36
CATH. U.L. REV. 587, 589 (1987) (expressing optimism that judicial interpretations of Rule 11 are
yielding desirable balance) with, eg., Nelken, supra note 4 (suggesting modifications of Rule 11 to
avoid chilling vigorous advocacy) and Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013,
1018-25 (1988) (suggesting focus on attorney's reasonableness in pre-filing inquiry, rather than frivo-
lousness of claim or defense, in Rule 11 enforcement).
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considering any major revisions. One of the studies, by Thomas Willging
for the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), was based on judge and attorney
interviews and on published and database sources. It found widespread
if qualified support for Rule 11, major satellite litigation occurring pri-
marily when courts impose large compensatory sanctions as opposed to
modest deterrent ones, and modest sanctions facilitating settlement. It
also reported little chilling effect on creative advocacy or unpopular
causes, and some success in deterring frivolous filings.228
The other study, by a Third Circuit task force for which Professor
Stephen Burbank of the University of Pennsylvania served as Reporter,
gathered extensive data on unreported as well as reported Rule 11 cases
in the Third Circuit, and considered published literature and case law
nationwide. It corroborated the FJC study's findings on significant bene-
fits including contribution to settlement and the general lack of serious
chilling effects on zealous advocacy. It did, however, find disproportion-
ate imposition of sanctions on plaintiff's side in general and civil rights
plaintiffs and counsel in particular.229 The study calls for similar work in
a circuit with different approaches to Rule 11 sanctions.23
0
Among the main conclusions to be drawn from these studies appear
to be, first, that repeal or major overhaul of amended Rule 11 would be
premature. Second, to avoid costly satellite litigation and chilling of
zealous advocacy while retaining sanctions' desirable deterrent effects,
courts should be wary of making large compensatory awards. Finally,
the Third Circuit study should be promptly replicated elsewhere.
B. Incentive-Based Approaches to Calculating Attorney Fee Awards.
One of the greater problems with attorney fee shifting is the collat-
eral litigation it engenders over the amounts to be awarded. Indeed, per-
haps the strongest single argument for keeping the American rule against
fee shifting comes down to the question, "Is fee shifting worth it?"; at
least based on experience so far, the transaction costs of awarding fees
have been quite high. If the system hopes to rely on more fee awards as
one reform measure in finding a "better way," then it must deal effec-
tively with the problems of how to reckon them without usually facing
costly, extensive second rounds on fees.
Here, the approach of trying to use advance incentives for desired
behavior seems potentially quite fruitful. A first example comes from
228. See T. WILLGING, THE RULE II SANCTIONING PROCESS 1-2 (1988).
229. See RULE I 1 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, at xiv (1989).
230. See id at xiv-xv.
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Professor John Leubsdorf's proposal for afixed risk contingency multi-
plier, which would involve a single ratio (such as 1.5 or 2) set in advance
to govern all cases of a certain type.2 31 The frequent practice until re-
cently, of setting multipliers after the fact on a case-by-case basis, some-
what perversely paid handsome rewards for rare success in making a silk
purse out of what prospectively looked like a sow's ear. It thus assessed
the stiffest awards against defendants whose resistance, at least in ad-
vance, seemed most reasonable. A less egregious, but probably more in-
sidious, defect of the case-by-case approach is that it fails to exploit the
possibility of giving attorneys incentives to take cases down to but not
below a certain level of likely success, which a fixed ratio would accom-
plish.232 The Leubsdorf proposal also should reduce transaction costs by
permitting courts to avoid litigation over the exact amount of the multi-
plier after the merits have been settled or decided.
Another measure, suggested by such commentators as Professors
Kevin Clermont233 and John Coffee,234 is to depart at least to some ex-
tent from the rate-times-hours "lodestar" approach for calculating fees.
Although recently strongly endorsed by the Supreme Court,235 the lode-
star method engenders much litigation over the applicable rates ind
number of hours reasonably spent. Among other problems, it provides
attorneys with an incentive to spend too many hours on a case and then
in effect calls on the court to sanction the attorney for bill-padding by
disallowing hours, a process that is inevitably contentious. Assuming the
lodestar remains the dominant approach-which it must for such situa-
tions as most claims for injunctive or declaratory relief, and fee awards to
231. See Leubsdorf, supra note 157, at 501-04.
A majority of the Supreme Court appears to have concluded that contingency multipliers are
permissible in some circumstances under present federal attorney fee statutes. Pennsylvania v. Dela-
ware Valley Citizens' Council, 483 U.S. 711, 735-53 (1987) (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Mar-
shall, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting); id. at 742 n.7 (noting agreement of concurring Justice O'Connor
with dissenters' view on permissibility of contingency enhancements). The ruling, however, is one of
statutory interpretation only; the adoption of any fixed multiplier scheme would presumably have to
come by Act of Congress in any event.
232. If the idea were, say, to encourage claims down to those with two-thirds apparent
probability of success, the multiplier would be set at 1.5, or a fifty percent increase. If the legislature
wanted to encourage some types of claims more than others, the multiplier could be set in advance at
different levels for different types of cases. The five Justices endorsing contingency enhancements in
Delaware Valley II appear to have subscribed to the idea of general as opposed to case-by-case
contingency enhancements, but without settling on any specific ratio. See Delaware Valley II, 483
U.S. at 745-47, 751-53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 731, 734 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment) (compensation for contingency must rest on treatment of cases as a
class, not on risks peculiar to individual case).
233. Clermont & Currivan, supra note 157.
234. Coffee, supra note 157.




defendants-it might at least profit from some standardization, such as
regularized hourly rates, prescribed fee application forms, and handling
of all claims by a single magistrate serving like the English "taxing
master."
One alternative to the lodestar, at least in cases involving money
recovery, would be to base the fee award (which can come either from
the recovery, as in some common fund or class action cases, or from the
adversary) in part or entirely on the amount recovered. The theoretical
microeconomics of such arguments quickly get highly complex, but the
Clermont proposal for a hybrid contingent and hourly fee can illustrate
the general idea. If a lawyer were to receive a fee based on a combination
of an hourly rate and a lower-than-normal contingent share, then in the
aggregate (including losing cases) the lawyer would be adequately but
not excessively compensated-yet in any individual case the lawyer
would be wasting time to run up hours when the chances that more effort
would increase the recovery were small. But the formula also should
counteract the temptation to accept a modest settlement too soon when
more effort might well benefit the client significantly. This approach
could both align the interests of attorney and client and, if extended to
the means of calculating a shifted fee, give the adversary some protection
against running up of hours by the plaintiff's lawyer. If those incentives
generally worked well, trust in them could permit much less intensive
review of the justifiability of hours spent.236
A further issue in connection with the calculation of fee awards is
the possibility of legislatively capping them at a certain rate. High fee
awards, particularly against governments, have led to much critical reac-
tion and to proposals for caps at such figures as $75 per hour.237 The
topic provokes much controversy; governments recoil at what they see as
their taxpayers having to enrich high-priced lawyers. At the same time,
defenders of market-rate awards see rate cap proposals as an effort to
reduce the enforcement of the rights of the impoverished, by making
their representation less economically competitive with regular commer-
cial practice than it already is. The incentive-based proposals discussed
above could reduce the problems that lead to calls for legislative caps, by
236. Cf Coffee, supra note 157, at 724 ("If one wishes to economize on the judicial time that is
today invested in monitoring class and derivative litigation, the highest priority should be given to
those reforms that restrict collusion and are essentially self-policing. The percentage of the recovery
fee award formula is such a 'deregulatory' reform because it relies on incentives rather than costly
monitoring.").
237. Such a ceiling exists in the federal Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(A)
(1988); 28 id. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (rate not to exceed $75 per hour unless court
finds special justification for higher amount).
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eliminating large multipliers and at least partially shifting the focus from
hours to recovery while still not compromising the enforcement of rights.
C. Offers of Settlement Affecting Fee Liability.
If attorney fee rate caps could be controversial, offers of settlement
as one possible path to a "better way" certainly will arouse disagreement.
The Civil Rules Advisory Committee's proposals to amend Federal Rule
68 in 1983 and 1984 drew much criticism, 238 and the Committee has
apparently shelved the topic at least for the time being.
239
While use of offer devices raises many problems, and the criticisms
are significant, the benefits that such rules might achieve could prove
substantial. They can "smoke out" realistic settlement offers early by
giving parties a positive benefit (possible fee recovery, or canceling fee
liability) from making such offers rather than the detriment of appearing
weak in negotiations.24° They give parties with strong claims or defenses,
who otherwise might have to yield more in negotiations than the merits
seem to warrant (because of the threat of unrecoverable fees of their own
or liability for the other side's), an effective way of countering groundless
opposition. 241 And they hold out the possibility, without adopting the
English loser-pays rule and incurring its negative effects, of affording vir-
tually full compensation: a party with a strong claim who makes a rea-
sonable, early demand will likely get either a good settlement without
large investment of lawyer time, or a judgment including a fee award.
This list of benefits, however, must not obscure the possible difficul-
ties arising from formal offer of settlement devices that affect liability for
post-offer fees. First, once the device has "smoked out" a reasonable
offer, the offeror in some cases may have reason to "dig in" and not be
forthcoming in further negotiations. It is attractive to make a formal
offer because it improves the offeror's expected outcome from trial-she
gets fee recovery, or does not owe the other side's post-offer fees, if the
adversary rejects the offer and does not improve on it. That very incen-
tive to make an offer-improving the expected results of trial-makes
238. See, eg., Burbank, supra note 4; Simon, supra note 101, at 12-19. Among the objections
urged most strongly were that the proposed changes were too severe in their likely effects on plain-
tiffs, that they ran counter to congressional policy in federal fee shifting laws, and that they exceeded
the rulesmakers' authority under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
239. See Simon, supra note 101, at 24 n.142.
240. See, eg., Cooter, Marks, & Mnookin, supra note 159, at 244-45 ("Offers to compromise in
effect tax hard strategies and subsidize soft strategies .... Both players will want to revise their
strategies to make more generous offers.") (footnote omitted).
In terms of some of the analytical themes developed in part VI, offer rules use transaction cost
incentives to reduce the transaction costs from extended bargaining and litigation; they strengthen
each side's reasons not to engage in strategic behavior that could lead to a negative-sum outcome.
241. See Rowe, supra note 92, at 169.
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trial relatively more attractive compared to settlement than if the offer
was never made, thus reducing the chances of settlement if the offer is
not accepted. 242 Second, offers can be a powerful weapon against the risk
averse, because they introduce the possibility of substantial loss where
none existed before. An insurance company, for example, can "low-ball"
a claimant with an ungenerous offer; then, even the fairly small chance of
having a verdict that comes in below the offer more than eaten up by the
high fees of company counsel might drive underfinanced claimants to
accept much less than the likely fruits of trial.2 43 Third, offers may un-
dercut the purposes of congressional fee award statutes by reducing the
encouragement Congress meant to give plaintiffs.
These problems should be at least partly soluble, and the potential
value of offer devices may be great enough to warrant trying to work out
the best forms they might take. The "dig-in" effect might be reduced by
providing that an offer would begin to affect fee liability only a certain
time after the offer was made. The impact on the risk averse could be
lessened by allowing fee-affecting offers only after first-round arbitration
awards, which serve to reduce uncertainty about likely second-round
trial verdicts; by disallowing adverse shifts against parties who were will-
ing to accept such first-round awards; by saying that failure to improve
on an unaccepted offer can reduce a plaintiff's recovery to zero but not
below; and by other means that retain but temper the device's effects.
244
And offer rules can be harmonized with congressional purposes in fee
shifting statutes by the approach taken in some lower federal courts since
the Supreme Court's Marek decision: the effect of failure to improve on
an offer, at least unless the rejection was baseless under Christiansburg
standards, can be limited to denying post-offer fees to a plaintiff rather
than extended to making the plaintiff liable for defendant's fees.2 45
D. Substantial Court User Fees?
User fees present difficult questions. They represent an attempt to
deal straightforwardly and efficiently with problems resulting from the
availability of public adjudication services at much below cost, which can
result in overuse and queueing. At the same time they may fail to ac-
count adequately for external benefits of fairly free access to courts (for
example, deterrence, creating precedents, preventing self-help), pose
242. See id. at 166-68.
243. See id. at 168-69.
244. See generally J. SHAPARD, THE INFLUENCE OF RULES RESPECTING RECOVERY OF AT-
TORNEYS' FEES ON SETTLEMENT OF CIVIL CASES (1984).
245. See, eg., Crossman v. Marcoccio, 806 F.2d 329, 333 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1029 (1987).
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many practical problems, discriminate against plaintiffs, and encounter
some serious constitutional objections. Judge Posner advocates user fees
to influence forum choices and reduce federal court overloads;2 46 former
Solicitor General Rex Lee, asking why court access should be favored
among ways the government spends money to help the poor, urges user
fees on a fairly general basis;247 Professor Alsehuler suggests them only
for cases in which a party rejects, and fails at trial to improve on, the
result of a less formal first-stage adjudication.
248
Under the English practice in which costs (including attorney fees)
"follow the event," court user charges simply increase the burden of
costs that losers normally bear. In this country, where losers do not gen-
erally pay substantially beyond judgments on the merits, more-than-
token user fees would raise several issues. When would the fees have to
be paid-in advance, which might limit access too much, be too anti-
plaintiff, and raise problems of eligibility for and litigation over waivers?
How would user fees be affected by the outcome of the case-shifted in
case of plaintiffs' success, which would charge defendants more heavily
than we do now, or unshifted, which would deny full compensation and
probably be too anti-plaintiff for many? Or would both sides have to
bear some user fee in any event-and would that be too anti-defendant,
especially when the claim was frivolous? Raising these questions is not
to imply that an efficient, just user fee system would be impossible to
devise, but rather to point out some of the problems that must be consid-
ered in making the effort.
In dealing with these issues it seems useful to identify the legitimate
purposes behind user fee proposals and, given their problems and the
benefits of free access, to ask whether user fees or other means are the
best way to serve the ends. The goals include discouraging frivolous
claims, reducing backlog problems from overuse of a service priced be-
low cost, and raising money to help support the courts. Some of the
measures already mentioned could help achieve these aims, particularly
fee shifting targeted against frivolous claims and ADR diversion to re-
duce backlog.249 Since court funding requires small enough amounts
compared to other services, and legislatures could reduce other court ap-
propriations, judicial budgets might not in the end get much net help
from user fees. In brief, the goals behind user fee suggestions are legiti-
mate, but ones that often can be served by other means.
246. See R. POSNER, supra note 46, at 132-34.
247. Lee, supra note 193.
248. Alschuler, supra note 31, at 1853.
249. Required use of ADR before judicial trial also amounts to a substitute user fee of a sort-
making the user go through another and sometimes costly process instead of paying fees.
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Yet even if broad user fee suggestions deserve to be rejected, some
use of substantial fees might be quite warranted in specific types of cases.
One use would be to punish and deter serious litigation misconduct; just
because other incentives, such as attorney fee shifting, exist and deter
some abuses, that does not require abandoning stronger measures when
the fee incentives are not strong enough.250 Similarly, user fees may be
warranted when well-financed adversaries try big cases that take espe-
cially large amounts of court time, and in connection with two-tier sys-
tems when a party dissatisfied with the first-round result fails to do better
after demanding trial.
E. The Uses and Misuses of Alternative Dispute Resolution.
The forms, purposes, benefits, and issues of alternative dispute reso-
lution are many. It appears both as a true voluntary "alternative"
outside the official system and as a more or less formal adjunct to court
or agency proceedings. In several ways, however, ADR fits with the con-
cerns and approaches this paper has stressed: it can facilitate settlement
on terms related to the merits by giving early previews of a case and its
likely outcome. It also appears that ADR hearings can, in a sense, en-
rich settlements. Although participants in court-annexed ADR must
usually settle eventually to avoid trial, arbitration hearings may at least
partially supplement bilateral lawyer-to-lawyer settlement negotiations.
This increased litigant participation may contribute to more favorable
reactions to the process. 251 Thus in some instances (especially routine
moderate-scale disputes) ADR may provide--depending on the outcome
of much present experience and research 252-a "better way" that is
cheaper than regular adjudication and high in user satisfaction, while
also avoiding some of the strains of protracted litigation.25 3
250. Cases in which courts have levied user fees, not just attorney fees, for frivolous litigation
include Edwards v. Marsh, 644 F. Supp. 1564, 1571-73 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (modest user fees against
both lawyer and client under Rule 11); Robinson v. Moses, 644 F. Supp. 975, 982-83 (N.D. Ind.
1986) (substantial user fees as Rule 11 sanction against pro se litigant). See also, e.g., Cannon v.
Loyola Univ., 116 F.R.D. 244, 245-46 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (threatening to impose Rule 11 sanctions
payable to court for waste of judicial resources, and citing other cases).
251. See S. CLARKE, L. DONNELLY, & S. GROVE, COURT-ORDERED ARBITRATION IN NORTH
CAROLINA: AN EVALUATION OF ITS EFFECTS 78 (1989) [hereinafter S. CLARKE].
252. See, eg., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 1987 ANNUAL REPORT 20-21 (mentioning studies
under way of several federal districts' court-annexed arbitration programs).
253. For a critique of participant satisfaction as a criterion of quality in evaluating ADR mecha-
nisms, see Luban, The Quality of Justice, 66 DEN. U.L. RE. 381, 403-07 (1989). Luban argues that
using participant satisfaction as a measure overlooks externalities, "sour grapes" attitude changes,
problems with interpersonal utility comparisons, and substantive values. Partly, these criticisms can
be met by the structure of the ADR system itself (as by excluding types of cases with significant
externalities). Moreover, dispute processing characteristics that lead to high participant satisfaction
may also tend to produce results viewed as accurate. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89.
[V/ol. 1989:824
Vol. 1989:824] PATHS TO A "BETTER WAY"
To the extent that it aids settlement, ADR could complement (and
even precede) offer devices; for it seems that to get reluctant parties to
bargain seriously around realistic levels early on, what is needed is either
third party intervention or a device that makes especially clear the bene-
fits (especially, saved litigation costs) from early settlement. And in their
possible use for mid-sized disputes, ADR mechanisms may turn out to
provide the "tracking" approach that best spares such controversies from
the threats of excessive formality, cost, delay, and harsh antagonism that
many see in regular litigation. In both these respects, ADR has the pur-
pose or effect of dealing with the problems of "negative-sum" situations.
Several ADR devices that are not final and binding serve the pur-
pose of providing an early outside evaluation and thus aid settlement in a
relatively noncoercive way. Examples include voluntary mini-trials,
"summary" (advisory) jury trials, "early neutral evaluation, '254 and
court-annexed arbitration.255 The evaluation results so far have been
generally favorable.256 Yet despite these mostly positive user responses,
it is a commonly noted paradox that voluntary ADR programs have
254. See Levine, Northern District of California Adopts Early Neutral Evaluation to Expedite
Dispute Resolution, 72 JUDICATURE 235 (1989) (describing procedure of early assessment of cases by
experienced attorney, and permanent adoption of program after favorable experimental results).
255. Further research might confirm an impression that in significant respects, American and
West German systems are converging from different directions on something like Professor Al-
schuler's suggested "two-tier" trial system. See Alschuler, supra note 31, at 1845-46. American
reforms often introduce some sort of relatively quick neutral evaluation before our extensive pretrial
discovery, preserving the right to regular court trial if the parties do not accept the preliminary
award or settle. The Germans, trying to move toward American-style single event trials, see supra
note 109, but lacking our pretrial procedures, temper the danger of trial results skewed by surprise
with an "appeal" that can involve de novo factfinding. See R. TROTr, supra note 109, at 58-59
(although recent West German reforms have tried to reduce the introduction of new facts and issues
on appeal).
The result in both systems seems to be a fairly rough-and-ready first hearing that is likely to
suffice for many disputes, with the backstop of a more formal proceeding that builds on the first
round. If this convergence is indeed taking place, and particularly if anything similar is also happen-
ing in other industrialized democracies, that may suggest that Alschuler's idea proposes a valuable
general model for ordinary civil dispute resolution processes in mass societies. Cf von Mehren,
supra note 109, at 623-26 (noting other recent tendencies toward convergence in American and West
German civil justice reform, including increases in managerial judging in both systems, fewer discon-
tinuous trials in Germany, and rising emphases on efficiency).
256. The literature on evaluation of ADR programs is voluminous. For a concise survey of
results as of 1986, see Hensler, What We Know and Don't Know About Court-Administered Arbitra-
tion, 69 JUDICATURE 270 (1986). For a critical survey with an exhaustive bibliography, see Esser,
Evaluations of Dispute Processing: We Do Not Know What We Think and We Do Not Think What
We Know, 66 DEN. U.L. REV. 499 (1989). Esser argues that the analytical frameworks underlying
most evaluation work are themselves in need of critical reevaluation in many respects.
For reports on particular programs, see, e.g., S. CLARKE, supra note 251 (North Ca.olina state
court-ordered arbitration); E. LIND, R. MACCOUN, P. EBENER, W. FELSTINER, D. HENSLER, J.
RESNIK & T. TYLER, THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS' VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT-
ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES (1989) (comparing litigant
perceptions of fairness in trials, court-annexed arbitration, and judicial settlement conferences, and
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been used less than one might expect given the evaluation findings. 25 7
That forces us both to ask why this is and whether the system can justify
requiring parties to go through ADR processes they do not elect volunta-
rily.258  One possible response is that adversarial attitudes, combined
with the substantial user fees voluntary ADR usually requires, keep liti-
gants from perceiving and acting upon potential gains from choosing
ADR. Or, as the slowly changing nature of attitudes has been described,
"Real men don't mediate. '259 Further, voluntary ADR in practice is
often final; with parties for whom that is a problem, court-annexed pro-
grams can eliminate it by preserving access to court.
Concerning ADR as a "tracking" device, proposals and experiments
abound-particularly to make middle-range cases worth pursuing with-
out excessive cost and burden to parties and the system.260 Some of the
finding them generally higher in trial and arbitration); Barkai & Kassebaum, The Impact of Discov-
ery Limitations on Cost, Satisfaction, and Pace in Court-Annexed Arbitration, 11 U. HAw. L. REv.
81 (1989) (finding both high client satisfaction and savings in time and cost); Broderick, Court-
Annexed Compulsory Arbitration: It Works, 72 JUDICATURE 217 (1989) (reporting favorable experi-
ence in state courts in Philadelphia and ten federal districts); Comment, The New Jersey Alternative
Procedure for Dispute Resolution Act: Vanguard of a "Better Way"?, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1723
(1988) (discussing New Jersey statutory program for voluntary arbitration in commerical cases),
257. See Pearson, An Evaluation of Alternatives to Court Adjudication, 7 JUST. Sys. J. 420, 426-
27 (1982); Sander, Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution: An Overview, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 1,
13 (1985).
258. An emerging issue in the federal courts is whether district judges have power under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 16 to require parties to participate in summary jury trial proceedings. Com-
pare Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 887 (7th Cir. 1987) (exceeds authority conferred by
Rule 16) with McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43,47-49 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (court may require
participation) and Arabian American Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448, 449 (M.D. Fla. 1988)
(same).
259. Thus the "Prisoner's Dilemma" situation provides a possible justification for mandatory
ADR. See supra note 161.
260. See, eg., Alschuler, supra note 31; Rosenberg, Rient, & Rowe, Expenses: The Roadblock to
Justice, JUDEs' J., Summer 1981, at 16. Both articles urge simplified initial procedures for cases of
moderate scale, assuring full court trial (but with possible cost consequences) if parties remain dissat-
isfied with the results of first-level adjudication. Another approach that attempts to combine the
advantages of individualized treatment with the availability of various "tracks" is the "multi-door
courthouse," now being implemented in a few cities. See, e.g. Kessler & Finkelstein, The Evolution
of a Multi-Door Courthouse, 37 CATH. U.L. RV. 577 (1988); Sander, supra note 257, at 12.
One recent proposal to encourage use of ADR has been a bill that would require lawyers in
federal court civil actions to file notice of having advised clients of ADR options, with Rule 68-type
fee shifting sanctions for failure to comply or for unreasonable rejection of a formal offer to engage in
ADR. H.R. 473, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. 2038, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). The idea has
received some prominent endorsements, see Silas, Costly Lawsuits: Senate Bill Touts Alternative,
A.B.A. J., July 1, 1986, at 19, but it made no progress in the 99th or 100th Congresses. It may suffer
from intruding too much in the lawyer-client relationship, from being too gimmicky, from overem-
phasis on sanctions instead of positive incentives, and from driving people too rapidly toward an
ADR system that is fast developing but perhaps not developed enough to handle a sudden rush of
cases pushed in its direction. See also Simon, supra note 101, at 80-81 (arguing that ADR and offers
of settlement can complement each other but should not be formally linked); Comment, The Alter-
native Dispute Resolution Promotion Act of 1986: A Critical Analysis, 31 ST. Louis U. L.J. 981, 997
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potential benefits have been mentioned already-speed, low cost and
stress, informality, user satisfaction. The dangers include adding yet
another level of proceedings to complicate further an already complex
process, 261 and that rates of seeking review will be high enough that for
many parties costs are greater instead of less. If court-annexed ADR
works badly, it can become an added part of the problem of negative-sum
situations rather than part of the solution.
Beyond such primarily empirical issues lie many deeper disagree-
ments about the worth and dangers of ADR. Mostly but not exclusively
from the left, ADR has been criticized on many levels-for formalism in
attempting to classify disputes for different kinds of treatment; for pro-
viding second-class justice to have-nots; for "cooling out" serious social
grievances by diverting deprived claimants to forms of proceedings that
provide effective protection neither for their rights nor against powerful
adversaries; for expanding the reach of the existing power structure's so-
cial control; and for exposing ADR participants to bias by taking away
the formality of full court process.262 These criticisms have begun to
(1987) (criticizing bill for not requiring early provision of information about ADR, and for vague
and discretionary sanctions).
Nonetheless, any defects in the particular bill should not obscure the possible value from explor-
ing the general path of encouraging just resolutions without resort to court. See Hazard, supra note
112, at 246:
[Tihe question for the legal system when justice is needed ought [not] to be whether it shall
be provided by the public courts or not at all. The question would be whether the parties,
particularly the stronger one, had tried seriously to bring about a just resolution of the
dispute through available private sources under auspices that are entitled to be respected by
the public system of justice.
Furthermore, could not resort to a mechanism of nonpublic justice be made a precon-
dition of resorting to court in many types of controversy?
261. For a discussion of whether mandatory ADR unconstitutionally burdens rights to trial by
jury, due process, or court access, see Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory
The Constitutional Issues, 68 ORE. L. REv. 487 (1989). Professor Golann concludes that serious
constitutional problems arise only in a few instances such as when poor program design or severe
penalties block access to adjudication.
262. See, eg., THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE (R. Abel ed. 1982); J. AUERBACH, JUSTICE
WITHOUT LAW? (1983); Brunet, Questioning the Quality ofAlternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL.
L. REv. 1 (1987); Delgado, Fairness and Formality, supra note 162, at 1391-1404; Merry, supra note
33; Nader, The ADR Explosion-The Implications of Rhetoric in Legal Reform, 8 WINDSOR Y.B.
ACCESS TO JUST. 269 (1988); Sarat, supra note 155; see also Nader, Disputing Without the Force of
Law, 88 YALE L.J. 998, 1019-20 (1979) (footnotes omitted):
[T]he relative power between purchasers and providers is a key variable with respect to the
ability of nonjudicial complaint mechanisms to resolve disputes satisfactorily. The funda-
mental problem that constrains the performance of alternative complaint mechanisms to-
day derives from their inability to compensate adequately for the ineffective bargaining
position of the individual who confronts large corporations and government bureaucracies.
The problem Nader raised ten years ago of imbalance favoring repeat palyers, while hardly
unique to ADR as opposed to regular adjudication, remains a serious concern. See, eg., Guill &
Slavin, Rush to Unfairness: The Downside of ADR, JUDGES J., Summer 1989, at 8, 10 (enumerating
circumstances in which ADR may unfairly disadvantage parties with fewer resources). On the
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draw responses,263 a major argument of which is that the skeptics com-
pare admittedly imperfect ADR to an unrealistically ideal picture of the
judicial system. For the most part, however, the critics and defenders of
ADR have not really joined issue.
264
To a considerable extent, these disagreements may not be amenable
to resolution by either argument or empirical research, because they
often proceed from sharply different perspectives and value emphases.265
To oversimplify, those who are strongly egalitarian and inclined to stress
doing substantive justice from a "system" perspective are likely to be
suspicious of many forms of ADR, while those who are more market-
oriented and inclined to stress litigant satisfaction from a "user" perspec-
tive will probably be more favorable. The values and perspectives, of
course, are not always polar or mutually exclusive; but since a social will
to provide resources for near-perfect justice in every case seems most
improbable, tradeoffs become inevitable-and with them, the issue of
how to approach rationally the issue of what sort of justice is good
enough in different kinds of situations. Distilling and advancing thought
on that problem has been a major effort of this paper.
whole, however, it does not yet appear that the disadvantaged are worse off in ADR than in tradi-
tional adjudication. Tyler, The Quality of Dispute Resolution Procedures: Measurement Problems
and Possibilities, 66 DEN. U.L. REv. 419, 436 (1989). For discussion of designing dispute resolution
systems to focus on interests rather than power, see W. URY, J. BRETr, & S. GOLDBERG, GETrING
DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICr (1988).
263. See, eg., Goldberg, Green, & Sander, ADR Problems and Prospects: Looking to the Future,
69 JUDICATURE 291, 293 (1986); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 173.
264. For an effort to draw on social science research concerning perceptions of procedural justice
to suggest considerations in designing court-annexed arbitration programs so as to minimize "sec-
ond-class justice" dangers, see E. LIND & T. TYLER, supra note 89, at 124-27.
265. See Tyler, supra note 262, at 435:
Different groups have approached the purpose of alternative dispute resolution procedures
from different perspectives and, from these varying perspectives, have found different issues
to be of primary importance in assessing the "quality" of dispute resolution efforts. This is
not only a difference of opinion about how alternative dispute resolution procedures should
be evaluated, but a reflection of value differences about the goals of dispute resolution.
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